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ABSTRACT
The Baltic Republics occupy a unique position within the 
Soviet Union. They are the most Western, the most industrialized, 
the most efficient and the most productive of all Soviet republics. 
As such, they epitomize the goals of Gorbachev's reforms. If the 
leadership were to crackdown on the current manifestations of 
nationalistic unrest and on the recently established quasi-political 
popular organizations in the Baltic, the result would be a chilling 
effect on the entire reform process. Therefore, the Baltic 
Republics, as long as their goal remains the support of
p e r e s t r o i k a ,  are being allowed to advance prev iously
unacceptable demands including autonomy and nationalism when
other republics, for example the Georgian SSR, have been
punished for such vocal defiance of central authority.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the linkage 
between economic and political decentralization using the example 
of the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union. This linkage is 
evidenced in the relationship between perestroika and glasnos t  
for without p e r e s t r o i k a ,  glasnost'  would not be possible and 
without glasnost ' ,  perestroika cannot succeed. The ’nationality 
question’ inherent in the Soviet system is bound to be exacerbated 
by such a decentralization. Therefore it is important to study this 
question and determine the ramifications of nationality relations 
in the context of a less centralized Soviet system.
Due to the fact that the Baltic Republics are integral to the 
success of the domestic economic reform, previously intolerable 
levels of nationalist unrest are currently being tolerated. This 
unrest is the manifestation of de facto  political decentralization 
resu lting  from the economic decentra lization  necessary  to
2perestroika.
P e r e s t r o i k a : The Domestic Im p era tiv e
When Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev came to power in 
March 1985, he inherited an economic system that was outdated 
and stagnant with an entrenched, aging bureaucracy desperately 
in need of change. The economic system had yielded a near crisis 
situation. The Soviet gross national product had been declining 
for over a decade; in 1983, GNP growth was 3.4%, in 1984, 1.4% 
and in 1985, 1.2%1. Lack of innovative thinking, individual 
initiative and incentives had led to a technological lag, with some 
experts estimating the Soviets were seven to twelve years behind 
the United States. Given that the bureaucratic structure does not 
respond quickly, the prospect of 'catching up' without a structural 
change was considered bleak. Eventually the technology gap 
would diminish the Soviets' military strength. With the Soviet 
superpower status defined only in the context of the military, this 
would be devastating. Economically, the Soviets are a backward, 
third-rate power, exporting primarily raw materials and natural 
resources and importing foodstuffs, machinery and technology.
This 'gap' is all the more frustrating to the Soviet people
1 United States Department of Commerce Statistics. Soviet Union, 1988
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1988).
because they are not as isolated as previous generations. The 
Soviet Union is no longer a predominantly rural and uneducated 
nation of peasants who have little contact with the rest of the 
nation or the rest of the world. The Soviet Union has become 
more urban; in 1926, 18% of Soviet citizens lived in cities, by 1987 
that figure had grown to 65%2. This new generation is also more 
educated; as late as 1959 only 91.3% of workers and 98.2% of 
peasants had only four years of primary school3. Since the early 
1970s it has been mandatory for all Soviet citizens to finish 
secondary school4 . Partly due to urbanization and education 
and partly due to better, more modern, communications, the 
Soviet Union has developed a modern civil society. This society is 
more politicized, more aware and more demanding of its 
leadership .
The information revolution of the late twentieth century has 
rendered national boundaries more permeable. It is no longer 
possible to drastically restrict the information which citizens 
receive. Soviet citizens are now more aware of living standards in 
their own country and in other countries. The Soviet Union has 
developed a large new middle class which has many unfulfilled 
expectations.
The implied 'social contract'5 between the Soviet citizen
2 Lewin, Moshe. The Gorbachev Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988) pg. 31.
3 Ibid. pg. 47.
4 Ibid.
5 For more on implicit social contracts in the Soviet Union see ;  Hauslohner, 
Peter. "Gorbachev's Social Contract." Soviet Economy, vol. 3, no. 1 (1987) 
pgs. 54-89.
4and the government is in grave danger of collapsing. The average 
Soviet citizen expects a job, health care, adequate food, adequate 
housing and an advancing standard of living. The stagnation of 
the Brezhnev years left the citizens without adequate housing and 
health care. Consumer goods were woefully inadequate in quality 
and in quantity. Food supplies were also inadequate; when food 
was available one had to stand in lines for hours in order to obtain 
it. Under Gorbachev, these problems have not yet been resolved 
and now p e r e s t r o i k a  threatens the Soviet citizen with the 
possibilities of unemployment and higher prices.
Gorbachev faces a dilemma. These domestic problems can be 
neither easily nor quickly addressed. The dilemma of the Soviet 
leadership is that in order to increase productivity and efficiency, 
they must provide incentives. However, monetary incentives are 
currently of minimal utility. The personal savings rate of Soviet 
citizens is already high due to the few, and poor quality, consumer 
goods available. In order to make any form of monetary incentive 
worthwhile, there must first be something on which to spend the 
money. However, an increase in consumer goods in unlikely 
without a prerequisite increase in productivity and efficiency.
Western technology is needed for retooling and modernizing 
the Soviet Union’s physical plant. However since the ruble is 
nonconvertible it will be necessary to find hard currencies to pay 
for the technology. Decentralization of the foreign trade 
mechanisms and the new Soviet Law on Joint Ventures are 
designed to facilitate trade with the West and thus attract more
foreign capital and technology. Such reform is also designed to 
force Soviet industries to become more competitive in world 
markets and to increase the quality of their outputs and increase 
the level of sophistication in Soviet products and management 
techniques.
Soviet foreign trade has sustained a double blow: cheaper oil 
and a cheaper dollar. Since 1985, oil prices have fallen 40%, 
leaving the Soviet Union with an $8 billion deficit in hard 
currency accounts6 . The Soviets sell oil for American dollars, 
which have sharply devalued during the Reagan years. However, 
the Soviets do much of their 'shopping' in Western Europe with 
Western European currency purchased with American dollars. 
The dollar's decline has essentially raised the prices the Soviets 
must pay to buy European goods due to the unfavorable exchange 
rate .
The joint venture law has not managed to lure large numbers 
of W estern businesses to the Soviet Union. Between the 
restrictions on profit repatriation, the limited ownership rights 
and the looming possibility of the failure of p e r e s t r o i k a ; many 
businesses have felt that the huge Soviet market is not yet worth 
the attendant risks.
Convertibility of the ruble has been discussed. However 
action on such a change is not expected before 1991. Therefore, 
the possibilities of purchasing technologies is severely limited. 
However, if a change in the in ternational clim ate  were
6 "Gorbachev's Gamble: The Soviet Economy." The Economist, vol. 307, no. 7544
(April 9, 1988) pg. 1.
6forthcoming, increased trade and lending could materialize in the 
near future.
The Soviet Union is no longer the second largest economy in 
the world. They are looking at the prospect of falling even further 
in the rankings with the 1992 consolidation of the European 
Community. And if one looks solely at exports, the Soviet Union 
ranks extremely low; far behind Japan and the NICs (n e w ly  
industria liz ing countries). Q ualitatively, the Soviets cannot 
compete in international markets, they cannot even compete in 
CMEA markets. The successes of China's economic reforms further 
erode the Soviets' place in the global economy. Consequently, the 
Soviet Union is no longer a model for Third World nations to 
follow. The underdeveloped world, especially the NICs, have 
chosen alternative roads of development. The failing Soviet 
economy can no longer afford to support T h ird  W orld 
revolutionary movements nor can it supply the massive amounts 
of foreign aid necessary to 'win friends and influence people' in 
the Third World.
The traditional Soviet fear of encirclement is no longer just a 
question of ideology, but also one of economics. They are 
surrounded by nations which do not share their ideology and 
which are vastly superior to them in the field of high technology. 
Pragmatism dictates that the Soviets strive to attain economic, 
and thus strategic, parity with the rest 
of the world. In order to do this, domestic economic reform is 
essential.
In addition to all these problems, the Soviet Union is 
experiencing its own 'Lippman Gap'7 which is that the traditional 
goals of the Soviet Union cannot possibly be obtained given their 
current means. In its current state, the Soviet economic base 
cannot support their military power for long, especially given the 
technological gap between the US and USSR. Paul Kennedy, in 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, asserts that if: "too large a 
proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from wealth 
creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then it is 
likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer
te rm 8.” This has surely been the case in the Soviet Union where
military industries have always taken precedence over
consumer industries.
The man who inherited this economic mess, M ikhail 
Gorbachev, is the first Soviet leader since Lenin to be college 
educated. Like Lenin, Gorbachev was trained as a lawyer. His 
public relations skills would be enviable for a leader of any of the 
industrialized nations. However, the Soviets are fond of repeating 
Andrei Gromyko's speech nominating Gorbachev for the position 
of General Secretary, that Gorbachev has a 'nice smile but iron 
teeth'. Despite his smiling demeanor, he is, and will continue to 
be, a formidable adversary.
Gorbachev does not have a free hand to rule as he would like;
7 For more information on the Lippman Gap see :  Huntington, Samuel P. "Coping 
with the Lippman Gap." Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 3  (America and the World 
1 9 8 7 - 8 8 ) .
8 Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (NY: Random House, 
1988) pg. xxiii.
8he has opponents and allies. The divergent views among the
Soviet elite will have ramifications on Gorbachev's policies. It 
will be necessary for him to see to it that his allies outnumber his 
opponents in order for him to ensure the success of his policies. 
In order to accomplish this, Gorbachev must not be seen as 
trading away Soviet security or making the Soviet Union weaker 
in any way. He must be perceived as strengthening the Soviet 
system.
P e r e s t r o i k a  (restructuring) is designed to radically change 
the economic structure thus enhancing economic efficiency and 
reducing the 'technology gap' between the Soviet Union and the 
industrialized countries. In order to reform the system, the 
p roblem s of ineffic iency , corrup tion , poor qua lity  and 
unproductive work habits must be addressed. G l a s n o s t ’ 
(openness) is designed as the 'engine of p e r e s t r o i k a '; g l a s n o s t '  
should accelerate the restructuring process, encourage higher
levels of productivity and spur the entrenched bureaucracy to 
more efficient ways; to pressure the system to become somewhat
more accountable. Glasnos t '  is also designed to increase public
faith in the system by reducing the 'gap between words and 
deeds' that has permeated Soviet officialdom.
9G l a s n o s t '
G la sn o s t '  is one way in which Gorbachev cannot only gain 
allies, a constituency for his reforms, but also a way in which he 
can change the traditional Russian and Soviet notion of reform and 
revolution from above, into a more lasting reform and revolution 
from below. If  the impetus and desire for true reform comes 
from the people, it will be more difficult for the leaders to revert 
to their previous ways.
Glasnost '  is most commonly defined as openness however the
current literal translation is 'publicity'; another word o t k r y t o s t ’
literally translates as openness. If one goes back to Old Church 
Slavonic:
"the root glas means voice or vote.
Hence the term suggests 'having one's 
say,’ and means at the very least not just 
'publicity,' which is compatible with rigid 
information control, but 'open publicity' 
or 'public openness,' which also allows
various voices to be heard9."
Thomas Remington further defines g l as no s t '  as "the principal 
force in a massive effort at social engineering directed as much at 
reconstructing Soviet political culture as at reform ing the
structures of power10."
9 Scanlon, James P. "Reform and Civil Society in the USSR." Problems of
C o m m u n ism , vol. 37, no. 2 (March/April 1988) pg. 41.
1 0 Remington, Thomas F. "A Socialist Pluralism of Opinions: G lasnost' and
10
The relative freedoms of speech and the press that have come 
with g l a s n o s t '  have garnered support among the intelligentsia 
and the nationalities; especially the Baltic peoples. The 
intelligentsia are currently enjoying the most literary, academic 
and artistic freedom ever. The nationalities have been allowed to 
more freely pursue their interests and cultures; going so far as the 
demands for autonomy in the Baltic Republics. G l a s n o s t '  is 
creating a support group for reform, groups which, because of 
openness, have acquired a vested interest in the reforms.
G l a s n o s t ’ is also designed as an accelerator for Gorbachev's 
reforms. Gorbachev has been encountering indifference and 
resistance, especially from the bureaucracy. In order to accelerate 
the pace of reform, it became necessary to generate calls for 
reforms from below and to enlist the aid of the people and the 
media in calling to account the bureaucrats who refused to 
implement new policies. G l a s n o s t '  is often referred to in the 
Soviet press as the 'engine of peres t ro i ka ' ,  as such it is supposed 
to drive the reforms to success. Openness is also designed to 
foment individual initiative and personal interest in order to 
motivate the people to be more efficient, productive and feel 
pride of ownership. These traits  would foster pride in 
workmanship and yield quality and care for the environment.
Many previous Soviet attempts at reform have failed. The 
constant tinkering led to peaks and valleys of economic output but 
no lasting trend of increased productivity or output could be seen.
Policy-Making under Gorbachev" (unpublished paper presented at the
Southern Political Science Association Convention, November 1988) pg. 1.
11
The word reform has grown to have negative connotations to the 
Soviet people due to the constant failure of previous attempts...so 
much so that Gorbachev deliberately avoids the word, calling 
instead for perestroika  or restructuring. Each time a reform 
failed, the people who had worked to achieve it were injured or 
punished. Such whimsy by the regime led to a deep lack of trust 
in reform. Glasnost'  is designed to help combat this lack of trust 
in reforms and in the government. It is supposed to make the 
restructuring permanent and irreversible so that mere whim 
cannot undo it.
Although lim ited relaxation of censorship  occurred in 
conjunction with previous reforms, such as the s o v n a r k h o z  
reforms of the late 1950s, there has never been such significant 
political change attached to economic reform. As the Latvians 
asserted at their People's Front Congress, "democratisation is 
possible only in a decentralised system. A decentralised economy 
is the road to democracy11." This linkage between economic and 
political change could be the final factor leading to the success of 
Gorbachev's perestroika.
Yet glasnos t '  has its limits. Exactly what those limits are has 
not yet been defined. The first arena in which we will see the 
limits to g l a s n o s t '  may be in the realm of the nationalities; 
specifically in the currently vocal and boisterous Baltic Republics.
Excessive criticism, especially of the Party, is still not 
allowed and neither is any explicit information on the Soviet 
military. Peter Hauslohner asserts that g l as n o s t ’ is a necessary
11 S W B . SU 285, October 18, 1988, B/4.
12
component of reform. It is essential to stop the ’erosion of the 
social contract between the regime and society’. The social 
contract, according to Hauslohner, is composed of the system’s 
promises to the citizens—such as a job, housing, medical care, 
food, social mobility and a steadily increasing standard of living- 
-and the citizen 's prom ise to the system —at least tacit 
acceptance of the political and social order. Clearly, both sides of 
this equation have eroded in recent years. As such glasnost’ is  
one way of rebuilding the legitimacy of the Soviet state.
As several Soviet dissidents have noted, g l a sn os t '  has no 
legal basis, "there exists no legislation to support or protect those 
who might seek to take advantage of the new policy12." And 
until Gorbachev's promised legal reforms in 1990, the anti- 
Soviet agitation and propaganda statutes remain on the books. 
Many observers also have reservations about g l a s n o s t ’, 
referring to it as an 'illusion of democracy' and that glasnost’ is 
primarily concerned with economic issues and not human 
r i g h t s 13. The policy of openness is another imposition from 
above, which can be withdrawn as easily as it was granted. 
Extreme pessimists in the United States classify g lasnos t ’ as "the 
modern civilized version of the Stalinist pu rge14" designed 
primarily to enhance Gorbachev's control of the elite and the
12 Baytes, Nina. "Dissident’s  Views of Glasnost'."Radio Liberty Research Bulletin
(RL 238/87. June 24, 1987) pg. 3.
1 3 Ibid. pg 3.
1 4 Goure, Daniel. "On G lasnost: The Status of Openness in a Closed Society."
Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 12 (1987) pg. 21.
13
n o m e n k l a t u r a  system and thus consolidate  his power. 
However, optimists believe that:
"G orbachev has used g l a s n o s t '  to 
liberalize social theory, relying on the 
l ibera l in te l l igen ts ia  to supply the 
in te llec tua l content supporting  his 
policies, and thus to employ the central 
media to popularize and publicize the 
contours of the reform program15."
Some Soviet dissidents are very pessimistic about glasnost ' ,  
Vladimir Bukovsky has called glasnos t '  "simply a short and very 
intensive effort to get through the current crisis16." Anatoly 
Koryagin has said that "glasnost’ has no legal basis [because] 
there exists no legislation to support or protect those who might 
seek to take advantage of the policy17" and therefore is mere 
window dressing for Soviet public relations purposes. Sharansky 
shares this pessimistic view saying that Gorbachev is primarily 
interested in economics, not human r ig h ts18. And Aleksei 
Myasnikov has written that g lasno s t '  is sanctioned from above 
and as such can be removed as quickly as it was granted19. 
Gorbachev himself has made statements about the limits to 
glasnost':
"Glasnost'  and democracy do not mean
1 5 Remington, Thomas F. op. cit. pg. 15.
1 6 quoted in Daniel Goure. op. cit. pg. 22.
1 7 quoted in Nina Baytes. oo. cit. pg. 3.
18 Ibid.
1 9 Ibid. pg. 4.
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that everything is permitted. G l a s n o s t '  
is called upon to strengthen socialism and 
the spirit of our people, to strengthen 
m ora lity . . . .Glasnost '  also means criticism 
of shortcomings but it does not mean the 
undermining of socialism and our socialist 
values20."
These are potentially wide ranging limits; defined from above. 
G l a s n o s t '  has widened the range of the permissible in Soviet 
society. However the general public remains skeptical and 
apprehensive about the new openness and with good reason 
because policy shifts in Soviet society can be quick and deadly.
Perestroika is an imperative for the Soviet system. In order 
for the Soviet Union to survive and prosper, economic reform is 
absolutely essential. And in order for p e r e s t r o i k a  to be 
successful, a social and cultural change is necessary to elicit the 
types of behavior necessary for that success; glasnost ’ is the 
method by which that change will be brought about. A close 
examination of the Baltic Republics indicates that the behaviors 
which glasnos t '  is attempting to encourage-- initiative, ambition 
and efficiency—in order to remedy the economic ills of the Soviet 
Union, are those already present in those regions. Furthermore, 
the Baltic Republics are also the most highly industrialized of the 
Soviet Republics and are therefore integral to the success of 
perestroika.
20  Gorbachev, Mikhail. "Strengthening Perestroyka  Through Real Deeds." 
P ra vd a . July 15, 1987. quoted in Natalie Gross. "Glasnost': Roots and 
Practice." Problems of Communism, vol. 36 no. 6 (November/December  
1987) pg. 74.
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CHAPTER 2
The Historical and Cultural Background 
of the Baltic Republics to the Soviet Occupation 
in 1940
Despite cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, 
the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are often considered as a 
single entity, the Baltic peoples. V. Stanley Vardys refers to this 
tendency as a single identity "forged by fat e1 During the 
twentieth century, the region has been subjected to a shared 
legacy of war, independence, war and occupation. This common 
heritage is why the three disparate nations are often treated as an 
aggregate. In addition, they share geographic proximity, a 
coastline along the Baltic Sea and a common exposure to their 
Slavic and Germanic neighbors.
In early history, the Baltic region was very active in the 
amber and fur trade. Amber was highly valued by the 
Mediterranean civilizations of the time. In trade, metal weapons
1 Vardys, V. Stanley and Romauld Misiunas. T he  Baltic States in Peace  
and War (NY: Columbia University Press, 1978) pg. 1.
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and ornaments were sent to the Baltic. This early contact with 
other civilizations helped to establish cultural and ideological ties 
between the Baltic region and Europe. Those ties continued 
throughout the Middle Ages. The Latvians were particularly close, 
com m ercially  and cu ltu ra lly , to the Scandinavians who 
transported much of their amber and fur to Europe. There has 
been a strong Scandinavian influence on the Latvian language and 
on folklore and customs. Similarly, the Estonians are linguistically 
and ethnically close to the Finns, thus Finland has had a strong 
influence on Estonian language and culture. Historically, 
Lithuania and Poland also developed close ties, although not 
always friendly.
The Baltic region is located between two large, and often 
hostile, ethnic groups; the Slavs and the Germans. Competition 
and resulting wars between the two for hegemony in the region 
has been extrem ely  detrim ental to any na tionalis tic  or 
autonomous feelings of the Baltic peoples. Strategically located at 
the Gulf of Finland, Estonia and Latvia guard the entrance to the 
port that is now called Leningrad and was a center of trading 
activity for merchants from Denmark, Sweden, Russia and central 
Europe. These two Baltic Republics have warm water ports, 
although the port of Riga occasionally freezes over in the winter. 
The rivers and streams which flow through the Baltic region, into 
the Baltic sea, are important tributaries of trade as they have 
been for centuries. The commercial, and later military, 
significance of their location is one of the primary reasons for the
17
history of conquests they have endured.
In the 19th century, Estonia and Latvia began industrializing. 
The capitals, Tallinn and Riga had major ports and were heavily 
laced with railroads to facilitate the export trade. This well
developed infrastructure was one of the reasons that both the 
Soviets and the Germans vied for influence in the area.
In contrast, Lithuania was a 'Great Power' during the Middle 
Ages and much of Lithuania's current national pride stems from 
this heritage. However, the sixteenth century brought a union 
with Poland which had two lasting effects; it brought lasting
Catholicism to Lithuania and the Lithuanian nobility became 
Polonized. "The older, more developed and culturally richer Polish 
social structure proved irresistible to the Lithuanian nobility
which eventually became indistinguishable from its Polish 
c o u n te rp a r t2 ." The Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility had 
the same effect on the Lithuanian peasants as the Baltic Barons, 
descendants of the Teutonic Knights, had on Estonia and Latvia. 
All were ruled by alien elites who shared neither language nor 
custom with the common people. The awakening of national 
consciousness in the three countries was due in large part to this 
dichotomy of ruler and ruled.
The Protestant and Catholic churches in the Baltic region 
were, and continue to be, very important to their cultural
development and to their nonconformity to Soviet/Russian ways. 
Unlike Orthodoxy, the Protestants and Catholics asserted the
2 Vardys, V. Stanley (ed.) Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a 
Nation. 1917-1945 (NY: Praeger Publishing, 1965) pg. 3.
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dignity of the individual, the necessity of striving to do good, the
notion of equality before God and the sanctity of life. These
notions are in keeping with the democratic tradition of the West. 
Orthodoxy, which was one of the underpinnings of the tsarist 
tyranny, asserting authoritarianism and oligarchical rule, preaches 
denial, suffering, piety and dogmatism. Orthodoxy encouraged the 
peasant to accept his lot in life with fatalism and asserted that
there is nobility in suffering.
The rise of national consciousness among Estonians did not 
begin until after the abolition of serfdom in 1816. In Latvia, the 
rise of national consciousness began slightly later. It was not until
the end of the century, and the long process of dismantling
serfdom, that the first intellectuals to identify themselves as
Estonians and Latvians began to appear. Books and magazines 
published in Estonian were rare, only 220 were published during
the 18th century3. Educated persons still read and conversed in
German during this period.
In Lithuania, emancipation did not occur until 1861. Lithuania 
still remained predominantly agrarian, very little industrialization 
had occurred. The Russians instituted a policy of Russification in 
Lithuania in the 1870s however the Russification of Lithuania was 
handled by the Russian Orthodox Church instead of political 
authorities. In Catholic Lithuania, the effect of a foreign, and 
rival, church intruding in their lives was unconscionable and only 
served to provide impetus to nationalist feelings.
3 Raun, Toiva U. Estonia and the Estonians (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1987) pg. 55.
19
Throughout the nineteenth century, the establishment of 
railroads which were necessary for efficient utilization of the 
Baltic ports brought urbanization and commerce. Along with 
urbanization came education in the native languages of these 
areas and "by the end of the century this was one of the few 
regions of the Russian Empire that had virtually eliminated 
illiteracy. Education and urbanization led to the emergence of 
middle and working classes.
At this same time, Lithuania was experiencing an intensive 
policy of Russification and colonization. From 1864 to 1904 the 
Latin alphabet was banished, all literary societies as well as 
Lithuanian schools were suspended. Partially due to these Russian 
efforts to suppress the Lithuanian language and culture, non- 
L ith uan ian  h is to rians  and e thnographers  began  studying 
Lithuanian customs, language and folklore fearing that the entire 
culture would disappear. The outside interest in the Lithuanian 
language and culture not only kept it alive but also renewed 
Lithuanian interest in it despite sanctions that were occasionally 
enforced by the Russian authorities.
N a tio n a l  A w aken ing
The ideas of the Enlightenment and the rise of nationalism in
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Europe were not unknown to the Baltic peoples. Long known in 
Russia as the "windows to the West", the Baltic peoples had strong 
ties to many European nations. During this same era, the Czechs, 
Slovaks, Poles and South Slavs were also striving for freedom as 
the Hapsburg dynasty teetered on the brink of dissolution. Some 
of the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as the rights of 
individuals and limited government, obviously also appealed to 
the Baltic peoples.
All three Baltic nations had suffered the oppression of a 
number of foreign conquerors; the Danes, Swedes, Germans, Poles 
and Russians. This foreign domination coupled with the 
oppression of a haughty and foreign nobility helped to foster a 
common identity and nationalistic feeling. "A foreign elite bent on 
depriving the peasants not only of their sense of nationality but of 
their human dignity. Such oppression proved a powerful stimulus 
and a clear rallying point, unclouded by any possible divided 
lo y a l t ie s4 ." Feudalism had sown the seeds of its own destruction 
in the Baltic nations as it had in the rest of Europe.
Cultural developments and the rise of indigenous nationalist 
elites were also characteristic of the times. Cultural and literary 
societies were formed during the mid-1800s. The first Latvian 
newspaper, Pcterburgas Avizes,  an Estonian newspaper, E e t i  
P o s t im c e s ,  and the first Estonian choral festival were further 
evidence of the rise of an indigenous elite5. The period from
4 Bilmanus, Alfred. A History of Latvia (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 
1970) pg. 233.
5 Von Rauch, Georg. The Baltic States: The Years of Independence.  
Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania. 1 9 1 7 -1 9 4 0  (Berkeley: University of
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1860 to the 1880s "was a period of conscious agitation by a 
growing number of activists who sought to convince others of the 
merits of a modern Estonian nation and culture6." Literature and 
music flourished. Ansis Leitans founded an association of 
Latvians in Riga as the Rigas Latweeschu Beedriba  which grew 
into a cultural society and became the virtual nucleus for the
national awakening. Members included scientists, writers, 
musicians and many others of the middle and upper classes. The 
organ ization  arranged for the pub lication  o f a Latvian 
encyclopedia, founded a national theater and opera, and
encouraged indigenous literary and musical works7 . Many of 
the provinces soon followed suit with societies of their own. 
During this time, Karlis Baumanis composed a Latvian national 
anthem entitled Dievs Sveti Latviju (God Bless Latvia)**.
Although Estonia and Latvia suffered from Russification 
during this time, the efforts were directed primarily against the 
Baltic Barons and thus, in some ways, were welcomed by the
peasantry. In Estonia and Latvia, Russification happened 
gradually and mainly took the forms of administrative reforms 
and fewer privileges and rights for the nobility. Thus
Russification helped to undermine the German nobility while not 
impacting heavily on the meager existences of the Estonians and 
Latvians. Later, by the end of the 19th century, Russification
California Press, 1974) pg. 8.
6 Raun. op. clt. pg. 57.
7 Bilmanus. op . cit. pg. 244.
8 Ibid. pg. 245.
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intensified and had a more direct impact on the native peoples.
After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, the Russian 
government became extremely oppressive. The reforms of the 
previous decades opened floodgates of nationalist fervor 
throughout the empire which the new regime would not tolerate. 
The new governm ent estab lished a program  of po litical 
centralization, economic expansion and Russification to "put a 
quietus on the democratic and nationalistic seethings of all the 
subject peoples on her western borders9." Russian became the 
official language in an attempt to slow down the resurgence of the 
Baltic peoples' native languages. This action coupled with the 
police actions of the Russian constabulary actually served to 
further fan the flames of nationalism.
Russification also affected education. Suddenly primary and 
secondary schools, which had finally opened to the indigenous 
peoples, were subjected to the controls of the Ministry of 
Education in St. Petersburg and Russian was made the only 
acceptable language of instruction. Since few of the Baltic peoples 
knew the Russian language, many of the teachers in the Baltic 
Provinces were soon of Russian nationality.
Censorship was established to reduce the influence of native 
writers. The censorship was "directed toward nullifying all native 
attempts to instill into the popular consciousness any nationalistic 
ideas and idioms or any democratic concepts10." The newly born 
indigenous intelligentsia rapidly found themselves unable to work
9 M i-  pg. 247.
10 Ibid. pg. 250.
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within: the Baltic Provinces. Often they were actively encouraged 
to leave the Provinces to find work, By 1900, 54% of the Baltic 
university graduates could find meaningful employment only in 
the Russian parts of the empire11. The result was not what the 
Russians intended; instead of diffusing nationalist feelings 
Russification actually increased them.
The Revolution of 1905 brought about a relaxation of the ban 
on the use of native languages in schools, a loosening of the 
censorship on the indigenous intelligentsia, and indigenous 
entrepreneurs and craftsmen were once again allowed to expand 
the cooperative system. In addition, the prohibition on the use of 
the Latin alphabet was rescinded; the rights of assembly and 
association and the right to change religions was granted and 
restrictions on small land owners were removed. But the 
relaxation of oppression did not last long. Soon a new 
Russification campaign began which was even more severe than 
the previous campaigns. Just prior to the outbreak of the First 
World War, some observers felt that "a systematic attempt was 
made...to obliterate all trace of national identity among the 
peoples of the Baltic provinces12." All political activities were 
severely restricted by the government.
In Lithuania, national awakening was integrally intertwined 
with the Catholic Church. The clergy had taken an intense interest 
in the Lithuanian language and in primary education. This 
movement gained further impetus from the Russification policies
11 Ibid.
12 Von Rauch, op. cit. pg. 16.
24
pursued by the Russian Orthodox Church. These policies pushed 
the Lithuanians even closer to their church and their culture. 
Russification was particularly harsh in Lithuania due, in part, to 
Lithuania's involvement in the Polish insurrections of 1863. 
Harsh measures such as the confiscation of land, burning of books 
and the forced emigration or deportation of large numbers of 
Lithuanians were common. Due to Russification and colonization, 
Lithuanian emigration reached a peak in 1884. Before the First 
World War, more than 33 per cent of the Lithuanian people lived 
abroad, mostly in the United States and Canada13. However, 
among the Lithuanians who stayed, a sense of national identity 
continued to flourish.
At the outbreak of World War I, Estonia and Latvia were only 
demanding the reorganization of administrative systems along 
ethnic lines while Lithuania clamored for independence. During 
the war, the government authorized the formation of Latvian 
battalions which eventually  exceeded 130,000 men. The 
formation and success of these totally Latvian battalions greatly 
enhanced a growing sense of national identity among the 
Latvians.
Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Provisional 
Government of the new Russian Republic  was received 
enthusiastically  in the Baltic provinces. The nationalist 
movements of the Baltic nations were encouraged by Woodrow 
Wilson's Fourteen Points speech of January 22, 1917. They hoped 
that the Provisional Government would honor these Wilsonian
13 Ibid. pg. 19.
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ideals and honor them. The call for self determination became the 
foundation of demands for independence throughout Eastern and 
Central Europe. The Russian governor-generals were recalled and 
replaced by representatives who were supposed to act as liaisons 
between the local and state governments. Local government posts 
were to be staffed by indigenous persons. The expectations were 
far greater than the results. The Provisional Government was 
virtually paralyzed. Still embroiled in war, the government was 
besieged with demands from all of the non-Russian peoples, 
including the Baltic peoples.
The Provisional governm ent under K erenski was not 
predisposed to allowing secession from the Soviet Empire or talk 
of national self determination. It threatened the use of force to
prevent Finland from declaring independence in the summer of 
1917. However, two months later in October, the Bolsheviks 
seized power in Russia and established the Soviet Union, creating 
an entirely new situation for the Baltic and other non-Russian 
peoples of the former Russian Empire.
On November 15, 1917, Lenin as Chairman of the Council of 
People's Commissars declared that all the nations of Russia had 
the right of self-determination which included independence14. 
This declaration was politically motivated, but the Baltic provinces 
took it seriously. The teetering economy of the new Soviet state 
could not afford to lose the most heavily industrial and 
prosperous of its provinces. The Baltic provinces were also
14 Vardys. Lithuania, oo. cit. pg. 9.
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strategically placed between Russia proper and the German 
enemy and control of the Baltic region meant access to port 
facilities as well as the protection of Petrograd. The Soviet 
leadership hoped that the declaration would buy them time. 
Instead, it hastened the move for independence among the 
peripheral provinces.
Dedicated to ending the war at any price, the Soviet 
government immediately began to seek peace with the Germans. 
Many of the non-Russian nationalities located between Russia 
proper and Germany became pawns in the peace process. When 
the Peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany was finally signed in 
March 1918, Russia renounced its claims to Finland, the Baltic 
states, Poland, the Ukraine and parts of the Caucasus.
The Years of Independence , 1918 - 1940
August Voldemaras formed the first Lithuanian government 
as World War I ended. However the fight for independence was 
only beginning. For two years, Lithuania had to fend off her 
neighbors—Germany, Russia and Poland—who all felt they had 
legitimate claims to portions of the new country. As soon as the 
Allies defeated Germany, the Soviet Union renounced the Brest- 
Litovsk Treaty and began a war to regain Finland, the Baltic
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region and Poland. All three Baltic states managed to fight off the 
Red Army and the Soviet government sued for peace. Estonia 
signed a peace treaty on February 2, 1920; Lithuania on July 12 
and Latvia on August 11. The Soviet Union formally renounced all 
claims on the Baltic countries. There were still problems with all 
three countries for several years, however the Baltic states 
remained independent. Of course the only reason these small 
states could assert their own independence was that the war 
induced the collapse of the leading powers in the area. Once the 
Soviets and Germans had regained their strength, the Baltic states 
would once again be in jeopardy of occupation.
All three Baltic peoples set up governments in the form of 
democratic republics. Due to their historical experiences with 
autocratic government under the Tsars, the Baltic peoples were 
highly suspicious of executive powers. Therefore they vested the 
majority of governmental power with the legislative branch and 
the executive was kept deliberately weak; it had to report to the 
legislature and was responsible to it. T h e  f l e d g l i n g
democratic republics immediately declared a universal and equal 
franchise and protection of the rights of minorities. The Baltic 
states aspired to be true Western style states. Inspired by 
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, they instituted a system of 
proportional representation and direct, secret ballots which 
further insulated the minorities from any possible repercussions 
from political acts.
A proliferation of political parties, combined with the nature of 
proportional representation, necessitated governments formed by
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coalition groups. This may have been the strongest factor 
contributing to the weakness of these systems which eventually 
led to more authoritarian rule.
Agrarian reforms, foreign trade and the prom otion of 
education and culture were the primary agenda for the new 
states. World War I, followed by the wars of independence, had 
so devastated their economies that in order to retain their 
viability, or some say in order to prove their viability, a focus on 
internal affairs was highly necessary.
The newly independent Baltic states were too small and 
resource-poor to become self sufficient. Consequently, they were 
highly dependent on foreign trade. Due to the chaos of the Soviet 
civil war and Baltic fears of reannexation, the Baltic states had lost 
their primary, and closest, export market. In the past, the Baltic 
ports had serviced the Russian Navy, shipped Russian goods and 
received Russian imports. After independence, they had to find 
other customers for their port facilities. Textiles and agricultural 
products had also been exported to the huge Russian market. 
After independence Britain and Germany became the Baltic states' 
largest trading partners.
Due to the small size of the Baltic states, discussions of 
economic and defensive alliances began almost immediately upon 
independence. The three had similar problems; small economies, 
a dependence on foreign trade and the danger of their location 
between the two hostile powers of Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Economic federation would allow the Baltic states to enjoy
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economies of scale and to become more specialized. Defensive 
alliance would enhance Baltic security. Proposals for a 'Baltic 
Federation' ranged from a union of the three Baltic states of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to a larger union including Finland, 
Poland and much of Scandinavia. Although several bilateral 
treaties were signed, the most promising federation was the Baltic 
Entente formed in 1934. The Baltic Entente coordinated the 
international relations of the three Baltic nations but never 
developed further .
Education and culture were the two areas in which the Baltic 
states had the most success. Literacy was high even before 
independence but neared 100% during independence. All three 
Baltic states established free compulsory primary education; 
Latvia and Estonia began their educational programs immediately 
upon their declarations of independence. Latvia required the 
teaching of Latvian history, geography and language even among 
the special minority schools which were allowed to be taught in 
their own language. Lithuania was slow to establish its program 
of compulsory education and the program was not initiated until 
1931. But even Lithuania, which was third among the Baltic 
states in educational accomplishment, was well ahead of Poland 
and the Soviet Union15. Secondary education was voluntary and 
required the payment of a modest tuition. However tuition 
assistance was often available. Alternative vocational schools 
were also offered as were a wide variety of apprenticeships and 
training programs designed to facilitate industrialization.
1 5 Ibid. pg. 133.
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Prior to independence, there was only one university in the 
Baltic area; at Tartu in Estonia. In 1919, Estonia established its 
second university, the Tallinn Technical University. In that same 
year, Latvia established two universities; Latvian State University 
and Riga University. Due to the large numbers of degrees these 
universities conferred, health care improved dramatically due to 
the increase in the number of MDs and engineers, sociologists and 
economists. Trained managers also greatly increased in number.
Culturally, the Baltic states made huge strides. Art schools and 
interest in indigenous art proliferated. Public libraries sprang up 
in all three countries. Latvia produced more books per capita
during the independence years than any other European country
except D e n m a rk 16. The number of books, magazines and 
newspapers in the Baltic languages also increased significantly. 
Museums, literary and musical societies and academies of science 
also proliferated.
Although the Baltic states made huge strides in education and 
culture, they did not remain open, democratic systems for very 
long. Some experts assert that the reason the Baltic states became 
more authoritarian was "widespread political disillusionment born 
of acute economic insecurity17." The constantly shifting coalition 
governments in the Baltic states, the impact of the worldwide
depression, and the proximity of two large and proselytizing
ideologies--fascism and communism—may have contributed to
16 Ibid. pg. 132.
1 7 Bilmanus. op. cit. pg. 357.
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more authoritarian forms of government in order to maintain 
their independence in a time of crisis.
Lithuania was the first to come under a less democratic regime. 
In 1926, Lithuania experienced a coup d'etat led by the military 
and the fathers of the independent state. Hemmed in by 
emerging Nazism and crusading Communism, Antanas Smetona 
formed an authoritarian presidential regime. Estonia followed 
with Acting President Konstantin Pats declaring a state of 
emergency in 1934. Latvia’s Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis also 
declared a state of emergency.
As the power of Nazi Germany grew, the Soviet Union became 
more and more apprehensive about its national security. It was 
especially concerned with secure access to the seas and thus the 
Baltic states. If Germany gained hegemony over the Baltic states, 
the Soviet Union could lose access to the Baltic Sea thus 
landlocking its European navy and lose the Baltic states as a 
buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany. In order to 
ensure the maintenance of Soviet access to the Baltic Sea, the 
Soviet Union attempted to establish closer relations with the three 
Baltic states through a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts. 
These pacts not only established closer relations, they also paved 
the way for ra p p ro ch e m e n t  with the western countries and led to 
Soviet membership in the League of Nations. However, the 
primary motivation was to contain the influence of Nazi Germany.
The Soviet Union, however, was not satisfied with the non­
aggression pacts alone. The Baltic states had close economic ties to 
Germany, including the sale of large amounts of Estonian shale oil
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to the German Navy and the sale of foodstuffs, which the Soviet 
Union felt made the Baltic nations too dependent on the country 
which was posing a serious threat to Soviet national security. In 
addition, due to the numerous Soviet motivated p u t s c h s  and 
attempts to influence the internal affairs of the Baltic states, there 
was a fear that the Baltic states would side with Germany in a 
conflict between Hitler and Stalin. This clearly should be 
prevented. In order to ensure that the Baltic states would remain 
within the Soviet sphere of influence, the Soviets negotiated a 
treaty of nonaggression and friendship with Nazi Germany on 
August 23, 1939. In a protocol kept secret at the time, it was
agreed that in any future territorial arrangement Germany and
the Soviet Union would divide Poland between them, that the 
Soviets would enjoy a preponderant influence in the Baltic states, 
and have their claim to Bessarabia, lost to Romania in 1918, 
recognized. In return the Soviets pledged to stay out of any war 
between Germany and Poland, or between Germany and the 
Western democracies.
Shortly after the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression 
pact, the Soviet Union began exerting pressure on each Baltic 
state to agree to 'Mutual Assistance Pacts’. The pacts were 
concessions to the Soviet Union and provided for the stationing of 
troops and the acquisition of naval bases in Baltic territory.
Estonia was the first to submit to the Soviet pressure and signed
an MAP on September 28, 1939. Latvia and Lithuania followed 
quickly on October 2 and 10, respectively. By May 1940, the
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Soviets were manufacturing violations of the MAPs in order to 
more firmly control the Baltic states. Each state was accused of 
violating the spirit and intent of the pacts at different times. The 
Soviet Union gave ultimatums calling for the formation of new 
governments which were to be more 'friendly' toward the Soviet 
Union. *
When the Baltic states either refused to comply or did not 
comply quickly enough, the Soviets invaded. On June 15, 1940, 
the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania, followed by Estonia on June 
16, and Latvia on June 21. One month after the occupation of the 
Baltic states, the Soviet Union staged elections for new 
parliaments. Voting was mandatory and returns were reported 
before the voting even ended. The NKVD (Soviet secret police) 
were present to take note of troublemakers and non-participants. 
On July 21, the new assemblies met and formally requested 
admission to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership agreed to 
these requests on August 3 for Lithuania, August 5 for Latvia and 
August 6 for Estonia. The Baltic states became Soviet Socialist 
Republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and ceased to 
exist as independent states.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Baltic States Under Soviet Rule
The incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union 
was quickly followed by a reorganization of social, economic and 
political life in the Soviet manner. One of the first tasks of the 
Soviet regime was the eradication of all opponents to the
incorporation. As early as the forced elections of 1940, the Soviet 
secret police were noting dissenters and opponents of the Soviet 
way.
During the first year of Soviet rule, Russification began in
earnest. Chronic shortages of food and consumer goods began as 
numerous Russians moved into the Baltic area in order to enjoy 
the higher standard of living and relative prosperity of the region. 
The Red Army moved into the Baltic in force as well, they also 
immediately began to buy up food and goods from the
comparatively well stocked Baltic stores. In addition, the Soviet 
authorities began to ship large quantities of food and consumer
goods to other parts of the Soviet Union.
The economic policies of the Soviet Union were vastly 
different from those pursued by the independent Baltic states.
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Private property was expropriated and became the property of
the Soviet state. "Surplus savings", anything in excess of 100 
rubles, was confiscated and the banks were nationalized. The 
ruble became the official currency and replaced the local 
currencies at grossly unfair rates of exchange. The Soviets made 
huge windfall profits on the exchanges1.
The cultural advances of the independence era were quickly 
blunted by the Soviet occupation. The Soviet system of education 
was imposed on the Baltic peoples, including Soviet texts and the 
Russian language. Censorship was instituted and the publishing 
houses were taken over by the state and ’nationalist’ books, 
magazines and journals were immediately banned. Artists and 
writers were forced to join 'Unions' before they were allowed to
ply their trades and the 'Unions' enforced strict socialist content
on all works. All theological institutes were closed and any
government support of religion was ended. Further, a decree 
from Moscow announced that all marriages, births and deaths 
were to be handled by civil authorities.
Deportations of 'hooligans' and 'bourgeois nationalists' began 
on June 14, 1941. Large numbers of people were sent to labor 
camps and internal exile for opposing Soviet rule or for advocating 
a return to autonomy. According to some reports, even opposition 
was not necessary the Soviet deported anyone for almost any 
reason. Prominent nationalists and leaders of the independent
1 Misiunas, Romuald and Rein Taagepera. The Baltic States: Years of Dependence
1 9 4 0 -1 9 8 0  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) pg. 31.
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governm en ts  w ere  im m ed ia te ly  a rre s ted . D uring  1940, 
deportations of Baltic citizens averaged between 200 to 300 per 
m o n t h 2 . The actual number of deportations during the first 
year of Soviet rule vary however scholars agree that the numbers 
involved were massive. According to Clarence Manning, in June 
1941 alone, over 10,000 Estonians, 14,000 Latvians and 14,000 
L ithuanians were deported3 . Romuald Misiunas and Rein
Taagepera estimated that the numbers were significantly higher;
10,205 Estonians, 15,081 Latvians and 34,260 Lithuanians. This 
amounts to over 4% of the Estonian population, over 1.5% of the 
Latvian population and in excess of 2% of Lithuanians4. Toivo 
Raun has a much higher estimate of Estonian deportations, he 
estimates that over 19,000 Estonians were deported in 19415 .
Regardless of which estimate is correct, large numbers of Balts 
were deported because of, and resulting in, resistance to Soviet
rule.
At first, the resistance to the Soviet occupation was primarily 
passive, partially due to the preponderance of Soviet armed 
forces in the region. The Baltic people utilized boycotts, verbal 
ridicule and they ignored bans on the practice of religic n and 
observance of holidays. In addition, the Balts began to self
2 Ibid. pg. 41.
3 Manning, Clarence. The Forgotten Republics (NY: Philosophical Library, 
1952) pg. 219.
4 Misiunas and Taagepera. op . cit. pg. 41.
5 Raun, Toivo U. Estonia and the Estonians (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1987) pg. 154.
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publish nationalist works (s a m i z d a t ) to keep the opposition's 
morale high and to try to sustain their cultures and languages 
from the Soviet onslaught.
The Lithuanians formed a resistance group in October 1940 
called the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF). They planned and 
orchestrated passive resistance as well as setting up underground 
plans for armed rebellion at the outbreak of war between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. By 1941, Latvia and Estonia were 
also forming underground organizations6. After the massive 
deportations of 1941, these movements began to organize as 
guerrilla units to harass the Soviets at every opportunity.
The Germans began their invasion of the Baltics in June and 
July of 1941, and, following the year of Soviet terror, were 
greeted with open arms. In some places such as Kaunas, 
Lithuania, the indigenous populace overthrew the Soviets on their 
own and then welcomed the Germans hoping they would be an 
improvement over the Soviet occupation.
Unfortunately for the Baltic peoples, the goal of the German 
occupation was no less benevolent than that of the Soviets, and 
maybe less so. The Germans were looking for lebensraum  for the 
German people, they wanted to annex the Baltic Republics and 
Germanize the region.
Like the Soviets, the Germans wanted to deport large 
numbers of Balts. However, they had a different motive. Once 
victory over the Soviet Union was assured, the Germans wanted to
6 Misiunas and Taagepera. op . cit. pg. 43.
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make the Baltic area a German province, O s t l a n d ,  with only 
Germanic or Aryan peoples allowed. Therefore the indigenous 
populace had to be deported. Until victory was secured, the 
Germans planned to exploit the economies and peoples of the 
Baltic for the war effort.
Once again, the Balts suffered an unfair currency exchange. 
The Germans replaced the ruble with the mark as the official 
currency. Again the oppressor profited with huge windfall profits 
at the expense of the populace. Huge inflation resulted. Due in 
part to inflation and part to the German policy of exporting most 
foodstuffs back to the Motherland, rationing was introduced 
almost immediately.
Shortly after the Germans took over, a compulsory labor draft 
was also instituted, followed shortly by mandatory military 
service, for all men between ages 18 and 457. Both drafts were 
actively evaded by a large majority of the populace. Many men 
fled to the wooded regions of the Baltic area and took up arms in 
active resistance to German rule.
Due to the massive economic exploitation, the drafts and 
brutal repressions, the Baltic people began to form an armed 
resistance. The underground presses they started under Soviet 
occupation grew and produced large quantities of resistance 
documents. In addition, fighting units were formed. In 
Lithuania, two groups were formed to fight the Nazis and regain 
Lithuanian independence; the Lithuanian Front (Lietuviu Frontas)
7 Ibid. pg. 53.
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and the Union of Freedom Fighters (Laisves Kovotoju Sajunga). 
These groups merged into the Supreme Committee for the 
L iberation of Lithuania in 19438 . In the same vein, Latvia 
formed the Latvian Central Council and Estonia formed the 
Estonian Republic National Committee.
In 1944, the Soviet occupation returned following the defeat 
of the Germans. A reinstitution of the massive deportations and 
repressions served to encourage guerrilla groups in the Baltic 
states. The choice seemed to be to die fighting the Russians or die 
of starvation in Siberia, most chose the former.
The Baltic guerrilla units were called the "Forest Brothers" or 
"Forest Brethren" because they operated out of the dense Baltic 
forests. Of all the guerrilla units, Lithuania's was the strongest 
and best equipped guerrilla group called the United Democratic 
Resistance Movement (Bendras Demokratinio Pasipries in imo  
S a ju d is ) .  Formed in 1946, the BDPS coordinated armed and 
p a ss iv e  r e s i s ta n c e 9 . This may have been due to the dual 
repress ion  the L ithuanians suffered, not only was their 
independence crushed but the Soviets had threatened  the 
existence of their church. Lithuanian nationalism and the church 
had always been intertwined, but now they served to reinforce 
each other and the desire to overthrow the Soviets. Estonia's 
guerrilla movement, referred to as m e ts a v e n n a d ,  along with the 
movements in Lithuania and Latvia received additional support
8 Ibid. pg. 64.
9 Ibid. pg. 84.
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during the collectivization of agriculture during 1949. However, 
as hope of a restoration of independence waned, the partisan 
m ovem ents slowly faded. By 1946, the overw helm ing 
preponderance of Soviet power had rendered Latvia and Estonia 
fairly calm. Once again Lithuania behaved differently than the 
other two Baltic republics and maintained an active guerrilla 
resistance until 1956.
Once the war was over and the resistance calmed, the task of 
rebuilding the Baltic region began. The Baltic peoples were well 
educated and had a large number of skilled laborers. They had a 
fairly well developed infrastructure that had not been decimated 
in the war. Therefore it was more cost effective to enhance 
existing industry in the Baltic then to create new industry 
elsew here .
The R eaw akening  of N ationalism
After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Baltic peoples 
ten ta tive ly  began to reassert the ir  na tionalistic  feelings. 
Nationalism received further impetus after Khrushchev's 'secret 
speech* to the 20th CPSU Party Congress in 1956 denouncing 
Stalin and his terror. By the 1960s, cultural life was enjoying a 
virtual renaissance.
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By 1968, dissent began to appear in Estonia. Initially dissent 
was primarily concerned with civil rights issues; free speech,
press and religion. However by 1970 the content had become
nationalistic. The Estonian Democratic Movement and the Estonian 
National Front were demanding independence. These groups were
very small and were dealt a severe blow when four of their
leaders were sentenced to prison for 'anti-Soviet agitation and 
p r o p a g a n d a '10. Dissent broadened in the late 1970s. In 1977, 
eighteen scientists "condemned the pollution caused by careless
and overly ambitious oil-shale and phosphorite m ining in
E s to n ia 11." Shortly thereafter several Estonian dissidents joined 
with other Baltic dissidents and issued the "Baltic Appeal" for self 
determ ination on the fortieth anniversary of the M olotov- 
Ribbontrop Pact. In 1981, the same group issued a call for a 
Nordic nuclear free zone to include the Baltic Republics12. Tartu 
University has been the seat of numerous student protests dating 
back to the 1960s. The largest Estonian protest occurred in
Tallinn in 1980, over 2000 students marched who shouted anti- 
Soviet slogans and 'Free Estonia'.
In Lithuania, dissent began to reappear at the end of the
1960s and became progressively more organized throughout the 
1970s. A widely based movement began in the 1970s to revive 
Lithuanian folklore, including tales of 'the glory days’ as a Great
10 Raun. op. cit. pg. 196.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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Power. By 1974, the Soviet authorities clamped down on the 
folklore groups and sentenced the leaders to prison camp terms of 
from two to six years1 3 . The first major nationalistic  
demonstration since the crushing of the resistance in 1956 
occurred on May 18-19, 1972 in Kaunas. It began with the self- 
immolation of an eighteen year old Lithuanian named Romas 
Kalanta. Although the Soviet authorities prohibited participation 
in the funeral service, a huge crowd gathered and marched from 
the cemetary to the plaza where the immolation occurred. Chants 
of 'Free Lithuania' were heard and at least one militia man was 
killed. The following day over 400 persons were arrested in an 
associated dem onstra tion14. Sporting events also tend to spawn 
nationalist protests in Lithuania. In June 1972, a group of 
Lithuanian spectators at an international volleyball match in 
Vilnius refused to stand during the Soviet national anthem. In 
November 1975, 2000 spectators celebrated a Lithuanian win at a 
soccer match by marching through the city shouting political 
slogans, a sim ilar occurrence in 1977 drew over 15,000 
part ic ipan ts15.
S a m iz d a t ,  self-published material, is rampant in Lithuania. 
The most prominent of the s a m i z d a t  is the Chronicle of the 
Catholic Church in Lithuania, began in March 1972. In 1973, 
during a crackdown on the Lithuanian nationalist movement, the
1 3 Alexeyeva, Ludmilla. Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National.
Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan Press, 1987) pg. 66.
1 4 Ibid. pg. 68.
1 5 Ibid. pg. 69.
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Soviet authorities seized "not only typewriters, but a copy 
machine, rotary presses, hundreds of kilograms of printing type, a 
homemade printing press, a binder, stocks of paper and so on16." 
The C h ro n ic le  documents Soviet excesses, especially against 
religion, monitors Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Human 
Rights Accords and is an important source of L ithuanian 
nationalism. However, the C h ro n ic le  has ties to the Russian 
human rights movement as well, and receives much help from 
them, including help in smuggling the journal to the West. The 
main goal of the Lithuanian Catholic Movement is, like that of the 
Russian human rights movement, freedom and human rights— 
especially of religion—not independence or autonomy. However, 
the Catholic movement has many connections and interrelations 
with the solely nationalist groups and often they work together.
Latvia's resistance did not reemerge in an organized fashion 
until the 1980s and is more peaceful than those of Estonia and 
Lithuania. Isolated outbursts of nationalist sentiment including 
graffiti, use of the independence flag or the wearing of black 
armbands to commemorate the end of the Prague Spring were 
known to happen but were not widespread. The Afghan invasion 
provided some of the impetus for a revival of organized 
resistance. Banners proclaiming 'Free the Afghans and Latvians' 
began to appear and more than 15 Latvians signed an open letter 
to Moscow opposing the Afghan invasion and expressing support 
for a nuclear free zone in the Scandinavian/Baltic region.
16 Ibid.
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Latvia continues to be the quietest of the three Baltic 
Republics in terms of dissent. The most obvious reason for this is 
that they are already a minority within their own borders and 
therefore feel the Soviet presence much more strongly.
Soviet N a tio na li ty  Policy
"What does the phrase 'the Soviet national 
question' mean? It refers to the political, 
socioeconomic, and cultural interplay among the 
Russian-dom inated Party-state, the dom inant 
Russian majority, and the subordinate non- 
Russians. That interplay consists in a perpetual 
tug of war between the cen tra liz ing  and 
decentralizing tendencies built into the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics at its founding in the 
early 1920s17."
The Bolsheviks won the civil war partly due to the support of 
the non-Russian peoples by promising them some level of cultural 
autonomy and the right to self determination. Although Lenin 
believed that secession by the non-Russian nationalities would 
harm the socialist cause, he allowed a right to secession only to 
gain their revolutionary support. Lenin compromised his feelings
1 7 Motyl, Alexander J. "The Sobering of Gorbachev" in Bialer, Seweryn (ed.)
Politics. Society and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder:Westview
Press, 1989) pg. 150.
45
against secession as a "temporary concession to practical 
cons idera tion s18." Of course, concessions are granted only if there 
is leverage or power to demand them. And since the Bolsheviks 
assum ed that na tionalism  would d isso lve  as cap ita lism  
disappeared, this was only perceived to be a transitional problem 
needing a short term concession19. In the long run, Lenin felt 
that "the right to self-determination was to be promulgated in 
order to nip the desire for it in the bud20" thus defusing the 
nationality problem once and for all.
The centrifugal forces of diversity in the Soviet Union have 
led to numerous shifts in nationality policy; shifts from autonomy 
to suppression depending upon circumstance and leadership. 
Ideologically speaking, the nationality problem is considered a 
holdover from capitalism however recent leaders, Andropov and 
Gorbachev, have stated that the problem of nationalism will 
probably exist long after class differences wither away.
According to Gordon B. Smith, "Soviet authorities distinguish 
between the 'drawing together' (sb l i z h e n ie ) of nationalities and 
the 'merger' (s l i i a n i e ) of nationalities21 ." 'Drawing together'
18 Besancon, Alain. "Nationalism and Bolshevism" in Conquest, Robert (ed.) The
Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1986) pg. 6.
1 9 for more on the coming obso lescence  of nationalism s e e :  Karl Marx. The
Communist Manifesto in Tucker, Robert (ed.) The Marx-Enaels Reader. (NY: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1978) pgs. 469-500.
20 Goldhagen, Erich (ed.). Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (NY: Praeger 
Publishers, 1968) pg. viii.
21 Smith, Gordon B. S o v ie t  Politics: Continuity and Contradiction (NY: St. 
Martin's Press, 1988) pg. 309.
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implies some level of autonomy and allowances for national 
identity while narrowing social and economic differences between 
ethnic groups. 'Merger' implies the elim ination of ethnic 
differences and assimilation into a single group; most likely a 
Russian group.
In Marxist-Leninist thought, nationalism is relegated to the 
garbage heap of history, it is one of the last vestiges of capitalism 
and as capitalism is replaced by socialism then communism, it will 
go away, national self awareness will merge into internationalism.
Lenin used the 'nationality problem' to his advantage during
the formative years of the Soviet state. Immediately after the
revolution, he issued the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples
of Russia". This declaration stated Lenin's nationality policy in 
such a way that it would be attractive to the non-Russian 
populations. The non-Russians were promised the right of self 
determination and secession. Similar wording was later used in 
the Soviet constitution. Essentially, both Lenin and other Soviet 
leaders used this wording to court the non-Russian peoples of the 
Soviet Union.
In the case of the Baltic Republics, they were allowed to
secede in 1918 at a time when the Soviet Government could not 
easily prevent it. However, at the time of their annexation in 
1940 they had little leverage and little power to exact such a 
compromise.
Generally speaking, the Soviet Constitution's promise of the 
right to secession or separation is a rhetorical right at best.
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Chapter eight, article 70 of the Fundamental Law of the USSR 
(Soviet Constitution) establishes a "federal, multinational state 
formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the 
free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of 
equal Soviet Socialist Republics.22" There are now fifteen Soviet 
Socialist Republics (SSRs), or union republics, which make up the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ranging in size from the largest, 
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the 
smallest, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (Estonian SSR).
Each republic is inhabited by a nation, a people with a distinct 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic heritage and is ruled by its own 
Party organization, Council of Ministers, Supreme Soviet and 
constitution. There are three criteria which a nation must meet to 
be allowed to organize as an SSR; 1) they must border on a foreign 
nation or have an outlet to an open sea, 2) they must have 
populations in excess of one million and 3) the nationality 
involved must be a majority in the area23.
In addition to the Republics, smaller nations or ethnic groups 
live in autonomous republics, provinces or regions designed to 
allow each nation some voice in its own affairs. Currently there 
are twenty Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), eight 
Autonomous Regions (ARs) and ten Autonomous Areas (AAs). 
These smaller units have no right of secession and less power to
22 Fundamental Law of the USSR (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1977) pg. 29.
23 Medish, Vadim. The Soviet Union (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987)
pg. 31.
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influence the central government. The actual power and 
sovereignty is, of course, vested in Moscow. However, the 
nationalities do play an important role in policy making and in the 
Soviet system.
The phrase 'national in form, socialist in content' was 
supposed to reconcile the contradiction between the Soviet Union’s 
ethnic diversity and the centralization of authority in Moscow. 
Lenin was fairly sensitive to the rights of minorities and, 
accordingly, supported the federal system the Soviet Union has 
today. He tried to steer a middle course between the desires of 
the non-Russian minority for self rule and the 'Great Russian' 
nationalism of the majority. He argued for a 'new socialist man' 
and Soviet citizenship; hoping to break the ties of nationalism. 
'National in form, socialist in content' allowed each nationality to 
maintain its own culture and language but established Marxism- 
Leninism as the pervasive ideology of the system, commanding 
the ultimate loyalty.
Lenin also began a policy of 'indigenization' or the education 
of socialist cadres from minority groups. In order to retain the 
allegiance of the non-Russians, they must gain a stake or vested 
interest in the system. Therefore, indigenous elites were 
encouraged to form with the same privileges and rights as the 
central elites. The dilemma which still faces the Soviet Union 
today: How to allow cultural diversity thus keeping the differing
ethnic groups content while trying to forge a single entity with a 
single allegiance.
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After Lenin's death, Josef Stalin came to power in the Soviet 
Union. Stalin saw the Russians as elder brothers in a 'Soviet family 
of nations'. He felt that Great Russian' chauvinism and nationalism 
was inherently less dangerous than non-Russian nationalism. All 
things Russian were good, all things non-Russian were 'bourgeois 
nationalism' Stalin, would rule with an iron fist secure in the 
knowledge that he knew what was best for Mother Russia24.
Stalin distrusted the non-Russians. He deported over one and 
one-half million during the Great Patriotic War alone among them 
the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Kalmyks and Karachai25.
When the war ended, he claimed the Russians had won the war 
and therefore were to be recognized as the elder brothers of the 
Union, not as mere equals.
Stalin imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on the non-Russian 
populace. He actively discouraged cultural events and customs. 
He prevented the publication of indigenous works and avidly
promoted Russian works and Russian culture. The "Russification" 
of the tsar's had returned to Russia.
As Russian nationalism openly became part of official
discourse, nationalities began to be purged from high Party
positions. Local ethnic nationalism became treasonous. Stalin
24 Stalin's behavior on the nationality policy is curious, since he advocated a 
'Great Russian' mentality asserting the Russian superiority while he himself 
was Georgian. Most likely, he was following the tradition of Kaiser Wilhelm 
and Adolf Hitler who led nations in which they were not born and therefore had 
to be more nationalistic than the populace to prove themselves.
25 Baradat, Leon P. Soviet Political Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, 1989) pg. 316.
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revoked support for indigenization and allowed the Russian 
minorities in the union republics to claim special privileges. Soon 
Russians served in most of the high union republic leadership 
positions.
When Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, he relieved the Soviet 
people from much of the centralization and cruelty of the Stalin 
years. He allowed much more leeway and more autonomy to the 
non-Russian nationalities. Khrushchev condem ned Stalin 's 
'Russification* po lic ies  and even tua lly  condem ned S talin  
h im s e l f26. Khrushchev stressed "flow ering—rapprochem ent— 
merger" meaning increased freedom for nationalities which would 
lead to better majority-minority relations and eventually to the 
Marxian ideal of the withering away of nationality.
Under Khrushchev, the non-Russians once again began to 
attain high Party positions and wield some power in the system. 
Khrushchev was strongly opposed to 'Great Russian' chauvinism. 
So opposed that he banned a chorus of the Soviet national anthem
which stressed Russian nationalism:
"The unbreakable union
Of the free republics
Has been welded together forever
By Great Russia27."
In 1977, this ban was lifted, implying yet another shift in 
nationality policy.
26 Khruschev condemned Stalin in the tamed 'secret speech' to the XX Congress of 
the CPSU in February! 956.
27 Medish. op. cit. pa. 39.
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In many ways, the Brezhnev years were characterized by a 
desire for a 'return to normalcy'; no more reforms, changes, or 
schemes which had marked the Khrushchev years. Brezhnev's 
nationality policy stressed the Soviet nation, mature socialism, full 
national self realization of each nation while drawing closer 
together through 'mutual enrichment' and eventual merger while 
asserting Russian dominance.
Andropov and Chernenko, each served such a short period as 
General Secretary, that their impact on nationality policy was 
minimal. However, Andropov asserted that "national differences 
will continue much longer than class differences28" Thus he 
seemed to implicitly accept the existence of pluralism in Soviet 
society.
In economic terms, nationalities have traditionally been 
allowed more autonomy in prosperous times and less in times of 
economic crisis. However, there can be mitigating circumstances 
which modify this tradition. For example, a given nationality may 
be considered extremely vital to Soviet national interest at a given 
time and thus they would be allowed additional leeway.
The swings of nationality policy coincide with the swings in 
economic and political policies. When the Soviet Union is in the 
process of decentralizing or de-Stalinizing, the nationalities 
invariably receive more autonomy. W hile centralizing or 
Stalinizing, the nationalities lose autonomy.
Nationality policy is not a constant. It fluctuates with the
28 Conquest, o p . cit. pg. 237.
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needs and dictates of the central government and the demands by 
the nationalities themselves. Historically, nationality problems 
tend to be exacerbated by political and economic crisis. For 
example outbreaks of nationalism during the Ukrainian famines of 
1931-33 and the Alma Ata riots of 1985 which were precipitated 
by the removal of an ethnic Kazakh from the republic’s hierarchy 
and his replacement by a Russian.
Often, regional economic considerations exacerbate national 
tensions. In peres t ro i ka  a choice must soon be made whether to 
modernize existing technologies, infrastructures and equipments 
or to build new. Modernization implies favoritism toward the 
European region of the Soviet Union because that is where the 
majority of the existing industrial capacity lies. Building new may 
favor the Soviet Far East or Soviet Central Asia because the Far 
East has the raw materials and Central Asia has the labor force. 
However, the educated and skilled workers reside mostly in the 
European portion, primarily Moscow, Leningrad and the Baltic 
Republics. Any choice or combination of choices will elicit cries of 
injustice on behalf of the losers.
Capital for m oderniza tion  and/or new investm ent is 
extremely scarce in the USSR. More advanced and industrialized 
parts of the Soviet Union, like the Baltic Republics, are becoming 
increasingly  more vocal in their opposition to financing 
development in lesser developed areas of the country in the name 
of equalization of ethnic groups. Many of these well developed
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areas would much prefer to use their tax monies to enhance 
existing industries or in a wide variety of other ways within their 
own republic. The leaders of developed republics also argue that 
they do not get a fair share of their own resources and products
because of exports to Moscow or exports to underdeveloped
republics. Unequal modernization and a colonial style (internal
colonialism) allocation of resources (central authority takes what 
it needs, leaves balance) has also exacerbated nationalistic
tendencies .
Further complicating the nationality problem is the fact that 
the Russians are experiencing a demographic decline. They are 
rapidly losing their majority position in the multiethnic Soviet 
state. Although they will maintain a distinct plurality in the near 
future, the extremely high birthrates in Soviet Central Asia in
addition to technological and medical advances which will reduce 
death rates and infant mortality rates even that status will not
last for long.
The potential for a new round of attempts to Russify the non- 
Russians is inherent in the declining number of Russians in the
Soviet Union. Having been a solid majority and the dominant 
ethnic group for centuries, first under the tsars and later the
Communists, the chances that the Russians will intensify efforts to 
maintain dominance over the non-Russians is fairly good. Many 
feel that imposing the use of the Russian language on the non- 
Russian nationalities may prevent the Russians from ever losing 
control of the political system by institutionalizing the 'Russian
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way'.
Language policy is considered Russification in many regions of 
the Soviet Union, especially in republics which have experienced a 
high influx of Russian immigrants like Estonia. Estonians fear 
becoming a minority in their own republic and see any support of 
Russian language schools or the use of Russian in official capacities 
as a possible loss of ethnic identity. Latvians, who have already 
become a minority in their republic, also have very strong 
feelings against any perceived favoritism toward the Russian 
language.
The Russian language, from the Soviet viewpoint, facilitates 
communication between the nationality groups, serves to "cement 
the unity of Soviet culture and acts as an effective accelerator of 
the drawing-together of nations29." In a practical manner, the 
use of a single language within a multi-language state, a l i ng ua  
f r a n c a ,  would be vital for the purposes of communication. 
However, the use of only one of the many 'legally equal' languages 
coupled with the fact that that group also controls the political and 
military systems is a recipe for minority discontent.
In order to advance in Soviet society, a knowledge of Russian 
is virtually a prerequisite. All technical and professional schools 
teach solely in Russian. High Party posts also necessitate a 
familiarity with Russian. The non-Russian nationalities see this as 
discrimination and favoritism.
29 Solchanyk, Roman. "Russian Language and Soviet Politics." Soviet Studies.
vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1982) pg. 25.
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There is historical precedent for considering language policy 
Russification. During the 1930s, Stalin's government attempted to 
'reform non-Russian languages from within ' by ordering the 
introduction of Russian words into non-Russian languages. This 
was especially true of political, technical or scientific terminology. 
The principle upon which this policy was based was called 'the 
principle of minimum discrepancies' (p r in t s i p  minimal 'nykh  
r a s k h o z h d e n i y )^ 0 . Obviously an attempt to bring about more 
linguistic unity in the Soviet Union.
Additionally, the banning of the Latin alphabet in the Baltic 
area and the attempted imposition of Cyrillic was Russifying 
language policy. Many other nationalities also were forced to 
abandon the Latin alphabet, however the Baltic nations were 
among only a few who either resisted the ban or reinstated the 
Latin alphabet during a period of relaxed relations with the 
Russians.
In 1966, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet established a 
federal Ministry of Education which was designed to oversee 
republic ministries of education. The new ministry mandated 
curricula, length of the school term, exam requirements and hours 
of Russian language to be taught. Textbooks are uniform 
throughout the Soviet Union with the non-Russian republics using 
indigenous translations31. These are often perceived by the non-
30 Szporluk, Roman. "Nationalities and the Russian Problem in the USSR: an 
Historical Outline." Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 1 (Spring 
1973) pg 32.
31 ihid- pg- 37.
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Russians as attempts at educational assimilation.
The argument for internal colonialism is most prevalent when 
discussing industrial or modernization policies. When an industry 
is set up in a republic for which neither the raw materials nor the 
labor necessary for its success are present within that republic, it 
is perceived as a contrived excuse to import Russian cadres to 
operate it and to forever link the economy of the republic to that 
of the RSFSR.
Since the policy of g l a s n o s t  was instituted, many of the 
nationalities have formed groups to promote national interests or 
independence. The Russians are no exception. Pamyat  (M em ory) 
is the name of the group formed by the Russian nationality and 
seems to be promoting the ’Great Russian Nationalism' of which 
Lenin was so afraid.
N a tiona li ty  Policy U nder G orbachev
Nationality policy under Gorbachev is still evolving. When 
Gorbachev first assumed the office of General Secretary in March 
1985, many scholars be lieved  that "non-R ussian  Soviet 
nationalities (had) little good to expect from a man who, as 
Gromyko told us, smiles a lot but has iron teeth32."
32 Bilinsky, Yaroslav. "Nationality Policy in Gorbachev's First Year." Orbis. vol.
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Many felt that Gorbachev was so intent on his economic 
reform policies that he had neglected to learn about the problems 
inherent in the Soviet multiethnic state. Having spent the 
majority of his career in predominantly Russian or at least Slavic 
areas, he had little personal experience with non-Russians.
The 27th CPSU Party Congress, Gorbachev's first, stressed the 
importance of central control. This assertion, in and of itself, was 
enough to make scholars believe that the nationalities would not 
enjoy much autonomy under a Gorbachev regime. This belief was 
cemented further by a speech given at the Congress which stated 
"the national question, which has remained from the past, has 
been solved successfully in the Soviet Union33." It is doubtful 
that anyone believed the 'national question’ had truly been 
solved, more logical explanations would be an attempt to relegate 
nationality issues to a back seat under Gorbachev or a truly naive 
belief that the problem was getting much better by a political 
neophy te .
The 1986 Party program further called for "the development 
of the Soviet People's single culture, which is socialist in content, 
diverse in national forms, and internationalist in spirit34."
Shortly after the 27th Party Congress, the director for the 
Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences
30, no. 2, Summer 1986) pg. 331.
33  "Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Novaia redaktsiia 
priniata XXVII s"ezdom KPSS," Pravda. March 7, 1986. quoted in Bilinsky, 
op. cit.. pg. 332.
34 ibid. pg. 332.
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academician Iulian Vladimirovich Bromlei published a paper in
Ko m m u n i s t ,  the party's ideological journal, about the effects and 
the meaning of the statements at the Congress on the nationality
question. lie  stated that:
" the  fo rm e r ly  b a c k w a rd  n a t io n a l
h in terlands have long ago vanished; 
socialist nations have joined to form an
in te rn a t io n a l  c o m m u n ity - - th e  S o v ie t  
p e o p le -- th a t  is new in its soc ia l
parameters; there have formed common 
cultural traits that are characteristic of
Soviet people of all nationalities; national 
discord is a thing of the past; and the
fraternal friendship of the peoples, forged 
in their common creative labor and tested
in the most difficult of wars, has become 
the standard of life35."
Bromlei also stressed the need for all republics and regions to 
facilitate the development of a "unified national economic
c o m p le x 36" thus further lessening the individual role played by 
the nationalities in the economic realm.
With respect to education, Bromlei advocates that:
"It is advisable to train specialists for
the entire nation at republic institutions of
higher learning and, above all, to assign 
graduates to jobs throughout the Soviet 
Union as a whole. The interregional
35 "Soversh en stvovan ie  natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR," K om m u n ist 
(1986, no. 8) translated in Bromlei, Iulian V. "Improving National Relations 
in the USSR." Soviet Law and Government, vol. 26, no. 2 (Fall 1987) pg. 37.
36 Ibid. pg. 38.
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m obility  of the 'labor surplus ' rural 
population and the level of its vocational 
training can also be raised by training part 
of the ru ra l youth in ag ricu ltu ra l  
vocational-technical training schools in the 
Russian Federation37."
An 'internationalist' personnel policy can be greatly enhanced 
using such educational methods according to Bromlei. Education 
and personnel policy can be utilized to equalize the conditions 
under which the nationalities live. Localism and regionalism must 
be combatted using all possible tools. 'Soviet pride' and 'Soviet 
self awareness' are cited as the two most influential tools in 
combating the problems of localism and regionalism.
Integration, assimilation and the merging of the nationalities 
into a unit—the Soviet people—is strongly stressed throughout the 
article. Considering that K o m m u n i s t  is a well respected, Party 
oriented and government supported journal, the chances that this 
is a regime position are very strong.
Gorbachev has made several 'ethnic f aux  pas'  which have
often been taken as deliberate insults. During a speech in Kiev, 
the Ukrainian capital, on June 25, 1985, Gorbachev twice referred 
to the Soviet Union as Russia38. The Ukrainians were offended 
by this reference, equating it with a reassertion of Russian
nationalism and Russian feelings of superiority. In addition,
37 Ibid. pg. 43.
38 Nahaylo, Bohdan. "Gorbachev's Slip of the Tongue in Kiev." Radio Liberty
Research Bulletin (RL 221/85, July 3, 1985) pg. 1.
60
Gorbachev made a toast on the fortieth anniversary of V-E Day 
during which he not only praised the Russian people but he also 
used almost the same words Stalin had used in a toast on May 24, 
1 9 4 5 3 9 . W hether these slips show mere insensitivity or 
calculated hostility is unclear.
On the other side, Gorbachev appointed Eduard Shevardnadze, 
an ethnic Georgian, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and full voting 
member of the Politburo. He also promoted Aleksandr Yakovlev 
to the position of Party ideologist who, although Russian, has made 
several speeches highly critical of Russian nationalism.
Additionally, much of the more recent rhetoric on the 
nationality question has been extensively softened especially in 
light of ethnic unrest in Armenia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and the 
Baltic Republics. An alternative explanation for the softening of 
the rhetoric on the nationality question is that Gorbachev has 
learned more about the problem and has become more sensitive 
to the concerns of the minorities.
By January 1987, Gorbachev entered into a new recognition, 
a growing sophistication, in his understanding of nationality 
relations. At the Central Committee Plenum Gorbachev displayed 
what Alexander Motyl refers to as a more 'sober' assessment of 
the state of Soviet nationality relations, Gorbachev admitted that 
the Party had made 'mistakes' in implementing its nationality 
po lic ies40. Gorbachev "accused Soviet social scientists of having
39 "Bezsmertnyi podvig sovetskogo naroda." Kommunist (May 1985) no. 8, pg.
6 quoted in Bilinski, op. cit. pg. 341.
40 Motyl. o p . cit. pg. 158.
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painted an excessively optimistic picture of national relations41."
At the end of 1987, Gorbachev authored an editorial which 
appeared in the Party journal K o m m u n i s t . This editorial is seen 
as a clearer enunciation of Gorbachev's new ideas on the 
nationality question. The idea that the 'friendship of peoples' is a 
noble ideal but certainly not a reality, that nationality relations 
were in as much trouble as the Soviet economy and a clearcut 
admission that the nationality problem is 'inherent in the system’ 
itself were but a few of the revelations in the editorial42.
The change in Gorbachev's beliefs about the nationality 
problem seem to stem from outbreaks of ethnic rioting during 
1985 and 1986; possibly precipitated by a non-Russian perception 
that they would not fare well under his regime. In May 1985 
there were anti-Russian riots in Latvia. November and December 
1985 were full of rioting and unrest in Uzbekistan as the Russians 
tried to cleanup the remnants of the so-called Uzbek mafia. The 
next major rioting occurred in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan during 
December 1986. The Alma Ata riots stemmed from the 
replacement of the Kazakh First Party Secretary with a Russian. 
They were very violent and included calls for independence. Riga 
again broke out in riots during December 1986 and January 1987. 
On August 23, 1987, the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbontrop 
Pact which led to the incorporation of the Baltic states, there were 
huge nationalist demonstrations throughout the Baltic Republics.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. pg. 159.
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These events could not be ignored and, in part, led to the change 
in Gorbachev's perception of national relations.
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CHAPTER 4
Glcisnost’ , Perestroika and the Baltic Republics
"The im po rtance  of (n a t io n a l is t ic )  
demonstrations lies in what they hold for 
G o rbachev 's  p ro g ram  of r e s t ru c tu r in g  
(p e r e s t r o i k a ) the Soviet system. The 
demonstrations are a foretaste of the side 
effects of p e r e s t r o i k a  and suggest that the 
'national question' of the Soviet Union may 
prove to be the rock on which Gorbachev's 
reforms founder. As Gorbachev has haltingly 
come to realize, he confronts a dilemma: On
the one hand, p e r e s t r o i k a  is necessary to
revive the system; on the other, it is likely to 
aggravate the national problem and, in the 
long run, to threaten Soviet stability1."
The Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania occupy a 
unique position in the Soviet Union. Often referred to as the
Soviet 'window to the West', they are the most literate, most
1 Motyl, Alexander J. "The Sobering of Gorbachev: Nationality, Restructuring 
and the West." in Seweryn Bialer (ed.) Politics. Society, and Nationality Inside 
Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) pg. 149.
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highly industrialized and most Westernized of all Soviet republics.
Very few Balts serve in the ruling bodies, attain high rank in 
the military or high Party positions. Instead of these political 
roles, the role of the Balts tends to be economic and social in 
nature. The Baltic region is the most highly industrialized in the 
Soviet Union. It has had industrial growth rates among the 
highest in the Soviet Union since World War II. The Baltic 
Republics occupy less than 1% of Soviet territory and have only 
3% of the Soviet population yet in 1967 Estonia produced 19.6% 
of food, 13.2% of fuel and 27.2% of electricity; Latvia produced 
22.1% of food, 20.1% of electricity and 18.8% of machines and 
metal works; and Lithuania produced 21.4% of food, 21.3% of 
electricity and 19% of machines and metal works2.
Per capita income and standards of living are higher in the 
Baltic. In 1969 Latvia had a per capita income of 1515 rubles 
($1680) as compared with 1071 rubles ($1188) for the whole 
Soviet Union3. Personal income in the Baltic Republics is also 
the highest in the Union. In 1978, Estonia had a personal income 
index of 126.9, Latvia of 113.7 and Lithuania of 115.1 compared 
to a Russian average index of 100^. The retail stores in the Baltic
2 Vardys, V. Stanley. "The Role of the Baltic Republics in Soviet Society." in 
Roman Szporluk (ed.) The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the 
U SSR  (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1976) pg. 155.
3 Grossman, Mary Ann. "Soviet Efforts at the Socioeconomic Integration of 
Latvians." in Ralph S. Clem (ed.) The Soviet West: Interplay between  
Nationality and Social Organization (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1975) pg. 75.
4 Koropeckyj, I.S. and Gertrude Schroeder(eds.). Economics of Soviet Regimes 
(NY: Pergamon Press, 1981) pg. 120.
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have better quality and a wider variety of goods than those in 
other republics. Baltic workers also tend to earn higher wages. 
In 1978 , the average Estonian wage was 2136 rubles, Latvia was 
1932 rubles and Lithuania was 1890 rubles (Baltic average, 1986 
rubles) where the average All-Union wage was 1920 rubles and 
the Russian wage was 2016 rubles5. Following the pattern of 
high per capita and personal incomes plus high wages, the Baltic 
Republics also have high rates of consumption; Estonia has an 
average consumption index of 130.3, Latvia of 117.2 and 
Lithuania of 114.7 where Russia has an average consumption 
index of 109.8 and an All-Union average of 100^.
The Baltics ' well developed infrastructure , by Soviet 
s tandards , fac i l i ta te s  the tran sp o rta t io n  of the goods 
manufactured there to other republics or abroad; the Baltic region 
has many railroads, ports and highways. It also 'underutilized 
housing, production buildings and urban infrastructure' which 
allowed the Soviet Union to save scarce capital while still 
promoting industrialization during the first few five year plans7. 
Additionally, the Baltic region was "cheaper and easier to develop 
further than the much less accessible and climactically less 
fa v o ra b le  d is ta n t  reg io n s  of the S o v ie t  U n io n 8 . "  
In addition, the independence era ingrained in the Balts
5 Ibid. pg. 124-5.
6 Ibid. pg. 129.
7 Maciuika,Benedict V. "The Role of the Baltic Republics in the Economy of the 
USSR." Journal of Baltic Studies ( vol. Ill, no. 1, 1972) pg. 20.
8 Ibid.
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excellent production traditions. They began producing a wide 
variety of high quality, exportable goods such as footwear, radio 
equipment, and refrigerators which had a ready market in the 
Soviet Union, neighboring countries and Western Europe.
Because of the paucity of natural resources, the Baltic region 
has little heavy industry; it is limited to the extraction of Estonian 
shale oil and the cement industry. However, they have a highly 
skilled and educated labor pool, management skills, high rates of 
productivity and a well developed light industrial base. For these 
reasons, "Moscow has assigned the Baltic region the role of 
processor and technological specialist for which skills in designing, 
engineering and mechanics are required9."
For the Soviet Union, where external travel opportunities 
have been extremely limited, the Baltic region represents 'the 
West'; "the Gothic towers of Riga, the Hanseatic old town of Tallinn, 
the baroque churches of Vilnius, the modern coffee shops, 
restaurants, music, and more fashionably dressed women...the 
Russians regard the Baltic republics as sovetskaia zagrani tsa,  
russkaia zagranitsa or s im p ly  nasha zagranitsa—'our foreign 
c o u n t r y ' . 10" Under Swedish, Polish, German and Danish 
occupations, the Baltic region developed a culture and lifestyle 
very different from the bulk of the Soviet Union. The role of 
Western religion has played a large role in the culture of the Baltic 
region; Estonia and Latvia are Lutheran and Lithuania is Catholic. 
These are not only religions, they are traditions and values and
9 Vardys, V. Stanley, in Roman Szporluk (ed.l o p . cit. pa. 154.
1 0 Ibid. pg. 159.
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philosophies different than those of Russia. Lutheranism and 
Catholicism are also tied to Western tradition and W estern 
religious centers.
Estonia’s proximity and cultural-linguistic ties to Finland also 
add to the 'Westernness' of the Baltic region. The Estonians 
receive Finnish television and radio. There is also a large amount 
of tourist travel between the Estonia and Finland.
The Balts were also the first in the Soviet bloc to translate 
Western works into their native languages. Camus’ The Stranger. 
James Joyce's Ulysses, and the plays Porgv and Bess and West Side 
Story, all first became available in Baltic languages. This may be 
due to the regime's belief that the Baltic region is a good testing 
ground for new ideas with minimum All-Union effects, since few 
Balts leave the region and few Russians speak any of the Baltic 
languages.
In order for p e r e s t r o i k a  to be successful, Gorbachev will 
ultimately need the support of the majority of Soviet citizens. 
Since the process of change is lengthy and the goals long term, he 
may be able to build such a constituency for reform a little at a 
time. He began by gaining the support of the intelligentsia 
through g l as  no s t ' . Glasnos t ’ is also part of the reason for 
Gorbachev's support among the Baltic Republics. Openness allows 
the Baltic peoples more room to maneuver and allows them to 
vent their frustrations with the current system. At the very least, 
their demands are now being heard.
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In addition to glasnost ' ,  a political reform, the Baltic peoples 
support Gorbachev due to his economic reforms {p ere s t ro i ka ) . 
Glasnost ’ and  perestroika  reinforce one another. The latter is 
not possib le  in a m eaningful way w ithout the form er. 
Decentralization and increased regional autonomy have been 
among their goals since the days of independence. The Baltic 
peoples have a history of productive behavior and modern 
management techniques, which if they are allowed to use them, 
may help not only the Baltic situation but the All-Union problem 
as well.
In order to gain mass public support, it will be necessary for 
the regime to do more than allow the people to air grievances via 
g l as n o s t ’. A current Russian saying reminds us that 'one cannot
eat g l a s n o s t " , the Soviet citizens must see an appreciable
increase in the availability of food and consumer goods in order 
for there to be any appreciable change in their levels of support
for the reforms and the regime; g l a s n o s t ’ alone is not enough.
The most viable place in which food and consumer goods of any 
quality can come from within the Soviet Union is the Baltic region. 
The goods are of significantly higher quality than those from other 
regions. Despite higher quality and productivity, due to the small 
size of the economies in the Baltic, they cannot produce enough 
goods and services to satiate the entire Soviet market. However, 
it may be possible to export the higher quality Baltic goods to 
other nations in return for hard currency which can then be used 
to purchase the needed food and consumer goods.
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Pluralism in the Baltic Republics
The  m o re  re laxed  political a t m o s p h e r e  u n d e r  g la s n o s t '  h a s  
y ie lded  m a n y  u n in t e n d e d  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  A m o n g  th e m ,  th e  
formation  a n d  proli feration of g r a s s  roo ts  o r g a n iz a t i o n s  which 
are ,  a t  least ,  of a  quasi-political na tu re  a n d  c a n  be  found in all of 
th e  Sovie t  republics.  In th e  Baltic republ ics ,  th e  g r o u p s  r a n g e  
from national i n d e p e n d e n c e  par ties  to env ironm enta l  g roups .  The 
la rges t  g ro u p s ,  an d  t h o s e  which will b e  d e a l t  with h e re  a r e  the  
E s to n ian  P e o p l e ' s  Front,  t h e  Latv ian P e o p l e ' s  Front  a n d  t h e  
L i thuan ian  M o v e m e n t  in S u p p o r t  of P e r e s t r o i k a  or S a j u d i s .  
T h e s e  t h r e e  g r o u p s ,  which  I will r e f e r  to co l lec t ive ly  a s  
'm ovem ents ' ,  a re  not only quasi-poli tical  in na ture ,  they  h a v e  the  
b le ss ings  and  suppor t  of their local C om m u n is t  part ies.
The  m o v e m e n ts  do not refer to t h e m s e lv e s  a s  part ie s  s in ce  a  
multi-party s y s t e m  is not yet,  a n d  m a y b e  n e v e r  will be ,  legal. 
However,  their  functions  a r e  dec id ed ly  political in na tu re .  The  
Latvian P e o p l e ' s  Front  in S u p p o r t  of P e r e s t r o i k a  h a s  b e e n  
referred to, by the  Sovie t  p re s s ,  a s  a  "mass-affi liation socia l  and  
political m o v em en t . . . (w h ich )  un i te s  within its r a n k s  t h e  f o r c e s  
su p p o r t in g  th e  policy of re s t ruc tu r ing  a n d  o p e n n e s s . 1 1 " The
11 S W B . SU 279, October 11, 1988, B/1.
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E s to n ian  P e o p l e ' s  Front in S u p p o r t  of P e r e s t r o i k a  is, in the  
w ords  of their Const i tuent  C o n g re ss ,  d e s ig n e d  to:
" b e c o m e  a  socia l  g u a r a n to r  of r e n e w a l  in 
s o c ie ty  a n d  c o u n t e r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a t t e m p t s  
a t  s l o w i n g  d o w n  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  of 
dem o cra t i sa t io n  a n d  o p e n n e s s .  Its activis ts  
c o n s i d e r  it t h e i r  o v e r r id in g  m i s s i o n  to 
a s s i s t  real popula r  g o v e rn m e n t  an d  help the  
r e a l i s a t i o n  of t h e  p e o p l e ' s  will t h r o u g h  
e lec te d  governing  counci l s12."
T he  draft program of the  P eo p le 's  Front a s s e r t s  th e  im por tance  of 
th e  peo p le  to t h e  p r o c e s s  of reform. T h e  p ro g ram  a d v o c a t e s  
public opinion polling a n d  oppor tun i t ies  for "the  inhab i tan ts  of 
the  republic to t ak e  an act ive  part  in t h e  p r o c e s s  of renewal  of 
s o c i e ty  a n d  con t r ibu t ing  to t ru e  p e o p l e ' s  s o v e r e i g n t y 1 3 ." In 
o rd e r  to e n s u r e  th a t  soc ie ty  is jus t ,  t h e  p e o p l e  m u s t  join in 
political life a n d  m a k e  the i r  n e e d s  a n d  d e s i r e s  known.  T h e  
prob lem s  of the  Union a re  a s  much the  fault of t h o s e  who did not 
s p e a k  up a s  of t h o s e  w h o  p r o m u l g a t e d  t h e  pol ic ies .  T h e  
L i thuan ian  M o v e m e n t  in S u p p o r t  of P e r e s t r o i k a  o r  Sajudis  
s t a t e s  m any  of the  s a m e  pos it ions  a n d  h a s  m a n y  of th e  s a m e  
goa ls  a s  the  m o v e m e n ts  in Estonia  and  Latvia.
O n e  of the  m os t  important i s su e s  for all t h r e e  m o v e m e n ts  is 
' fuI l- republic c o s t - a c c o u n t i n g ' ,  se l f - f inanc ing  or  e c o n o m i c  a n d  
financial  au tonom y .  The  idea  w a s  p ro m p ted  by th e  s a m e  b a s ic
12 S W B . SU 274, October 5, 1988, B/1.
1 3 Ibid.
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p ro b lem s  tha t  p rom pted  G o rb a c h e v  to p r o p o s e  p e r e s t r o ik a ; poor  
avai lab i l i ty  of c o n s u m e r  g o o d s ,  ine f f ic iency  a n d  co r ru p t io n .  
Additionally, the  republics  pe rce ive  a  growing g a p  b e tw e e n  w h a t  
they  p ro d u c e  an d  w h a t  is availab le  to th e m  in t h e  s to re s .  T h e  
republics  have  no voice  in the  distribution of w h a t  they  p roduce ;  
this yie lds frustration with the  insolvency  of th e  s y s te m .  O n e  of 
t h e  m o s t  c o m p le te  s t a t e m e n t s  of republic  e c o n o m i c  g o a l s  w a s  
m a d e  by Lithuania:
"The s o v e r e ig n ty  of L i thuan ia  s h o u l d  e m b r a c e  th e  
m a n a g e m e n t  of all b r a n c h e s  of th e  nationa l econom y ,  
e c o n o m ic  polic ies,  format ion of t h e  b u d g e t ,  po lic ies  
on finance,  credit,  t rade ,  c u s to m s  a n d  t a x e s ;  our  own 
m one ta ry  sy s tem ,  social  securi ty  a n d  its dev e lo p m en t ,  
legis lation a n d  admin is t ra t ion  of th e  law, e d u ca t io n ,
c u l t u r e ,  r e l a t i o n s  with f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  a n d
r e p r e se n ta t io n  in in te rnational o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  a s  well 
a s  all o ther  s p h e r e s  of life14."
From the  2 1 s t  to th e  23 rd  of S e p t e m b e r  a  c o n f e r e n c e  of 
le ad in g  Baltic e c o n o m i s t s  c o n v e n e d  to d i s c u s s  t h e  i s s u e  of 
e c o n o m i c  a u t o n o m y  a n d  to c o m p i le  a  jo in t  p la t fo rm  for
su b m iss io n  to M oscow  on the  subjec t .  T h e  fo u n d a t io n s  of the
p r o p o s a l  w e r e  ' e x c lu s iv e  con tro l  o v e r  t h e  u s e  of p ro p e r ty ;  
inc lud ing  all land ,  m in e ra l  r e s o u r c e s ,  in lan d  a n d  te rr i tor ia l  
w a t e r s ,  t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l f  a n d  all p r o p e r t y  c r e a t e d  or  
p u r c h a s e d  by th e  s t a t e .  S t a t e  p ro p e r ty  in c lu d e s  indus tr ia l  
en te rp r i s e s ,  farms,  b a n k s  t r an sp o r t  an d  p o w er  ne tworks .  Military
14 S W B . SU 295, October 29, 1988, B/2.
72
ins ta l la t ions  of all-union im p o r tan c e  may  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  union 
p r o p e r t y  s u b j e c t  to l o n g - t e r m  a g r e e m e n t  with  r e p u b l i c  
authorit ies .  All m a t te rs  regard ing taxation will b e  h a n d led  by the  
r e p u b l i c 15.'
T h e  repub l ic s  a r e  to b e  i n d e p e n d e n t  " a s  r e g a r d s  the ir  
e conom ic ,  social  a n d  d e m o g ra p h ic  policies.  They  will b e  free  to 
e x e r t  contro l  ove r  p r ice s  a n d  in t roduce  the i r  own c u r r e n c i e s ,  
fixing th e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  with t h e  S o v ie t  ro u b le  a n d  o th e r  
c u r r e n c i e s  a t  t h e i r  ow n  d i s c r e t i o n 1 6 ." S u c h  a u t o n o m y
n e c e s s i t a t e s  an  a m e n d m e n t  to th e  Sovie t  C onst i tu t ion  s o  tha t
th e re  would be  legal g u a ra n te e s .
Another  important i s su e  for all th ree  m o v e m e n t s  is th e  goal 
of a  ' l aw -governed  s ta t e ' .  G o rb a c h e v  h a s  s u p p o r t e d  th is  i s su e  
strongly.  He h a s  r epea ted ly  cal led  for 'a  g o v e r n m e n t  of laws not 
m en '  in which a  Stalin would be  cons t ra ined  a n d  th u s  not al lowed 
to terrorize socie ty a s  he  did. The  Balts su p p o r t  this p roposa l  for 
s im i la r  r e a s o n s  bu t  add i t iona l ly  to p r o t e c t  t h e m s e l v e s  from 
'winds of c hange '  in the  Sovie t  sys tem .  G o rb a c h e v  su p p o r t s  them,  
but they have  no a s s u r a n c e s  tha t  the  next Sovie t  l e a d e r  will do  
th e  s a m e .  A ' law-governed  s ta t e '  would g u a r a n t e e  h u m a n  rights 
su ch  a s  free s p ee c h ,  free p r e s s  an d  f reedom of assoc ia t ion .  The 
b a s i c  id ea l s  of all of t h e  m o v e m e n t s  a r e  e m b o d i e d  in th is
p a s s a g e  from the Program of the  Estonian P eo p le 's  Front:
"The bas ic  idea ls  of th e  P e o p le ' s  Front a r e
15 JbM. B/4.
16 Ibid.
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to g e n e r a l  h u m a n  v a lu e s ,  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  
p lu ra l i sm ,  so c ia l  ju s t i c e ,  i n t e rn a t io n a l i s m ,  
r e s p e c t  for th e  righ ts  of all n a t i o n s  a n d  
pro tec tion of h u m a n  rights,  the  in te r e s t s  of 
t h e  individual a n d  of l a w fu ln e s s .  T h e  
P e o p l e ' s  Front  is g u id e d  by th e  G e n e r a l  
Declara tion of H um an  Rights,  co r re sp o n d in g  
p a c t s  a n d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  
w h i c h  d e a l  w i t h  f r e e d o m s  a n d  
o b l i g a t i o n s 17."
The  P e o p le ' s  Fronts  further d e m a n d  th a t  t h e r e  b e  "juridical an d  
practical  g u a r a n t e e s  of the  inviolability of the  p e r s o n ,  his a b o d e  
a n d  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  an d  for ensu r ing  th e  s e c r e c y  of t e l e p h o n e  
c o n v e r s a t i o n s 18." Additionally, any  pe r so n  c h a r g e d  with a  crime 
or  t r e a s o n  s h o u ld  h a v e  a c c e s s  to  in fo rm at ion  g a t h e r e d  to 
p ro s e c u te  him so  that  he  may  p re p a re  a  d e f e n s e ,  o p e n  a c c e s s  to 
d e m o g r a p h i c  a n d  stat is t ical  informat ion,  o p e n  a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t  
of S ta l in 's  ' h e in o u s  c r im es  a g a i n s t  humanity '  a n d  rehab i l i ta t ions  
of wrongly  conv ic ted  political cr iminals .  T he  P e o p l e ' s  Front is 
a lso  in favor of c o m p le te  f r ee d o m  of religious p ra c t ic e  an d  the  
aboli tion of all prior res t ra in t  c en s o r s h ip .
T h e  role of the  in d igenous  p o p u la c e  in th e  a ffa irs  of the  
republic a r e  a lso  of u tmost conce rn .  The  Estonian  P e o p le ' s  Front 
s t a t e d  tha t  "the decid ing of Es ton ian  m a t te r s  m u s t  t a k e  p la ce  in 
Es tonia  an d  a t  the  initiative of the  Es ton ians  . . . .(we must)  e n s u r e  
th e  p e r m a n e n c e  of the  Es ton ian  p e o p le  an d  a  hopeful fu tu re19."
17 S W B . SU 253, September 10, 1988, B/1.
18 ibid. B/5.
1 9 S W B . SU 274, o p . cit. B/2.
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Cit izensh ip  i s s u e s  h ave  b e e n  th e  topic  of m uch  d i s cu s s io n .  In 
E s t o n i a ,  t h e  E s t o n i a n  C e n t r a l  C o m m i t t e e  h a s  c a l l e d  t h e  
"introduction of c i t izensh ip  of t h e  E s to n ia n  S S R  a s  t h e  m o s t  
e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  t o w a r d s  fo rm ing  a  p e r m a n e n t  p o p u l a t i o n  in 
Es ton ia .  This will e n h a n c e  the  responsibil i ty  of t h e  republ ic 's  
ci t izens  for the  well being and  future of their  h o m e . . . . an d  d o e s  not 
ha rm  th e  main rights of c i t izens  of a n y  nationa li ty2 0 ." Es tonia ,  
Latvia a n d  Lithuania h a v e  a lso  all p r o p o s e d  tha t  the ir  ind igenous  
l a n g u a g e s  be  g iven th e  s t a t u s  of th e  official l a n g u a g e  of the  
republic.  They  do  not a ssa i l  th e  s t a t u s  of R u s s ia n  a s  t h e  All- 
Union l ingua franca  but a s s e r t  tha t  affairs within the ir  republ ic  
b o rde rs  should  be  conducted  in their own language .  Migration into 
t h e  repub l ics  is a lso  an im por tan t  c o n c e rn .  T h e  L a tv ians  a r e  
a l r e ad y  a  minority in the ir  own republic  a n d  th e  E s t o n i a n s  a re  
rapidly head ing  tha t  way. T he  P e o p le ' s  Fronts  p r o p o s e  limits to 
i m m ig r a t io n  a s  well a s  c u l tu r a l ,  l i n g u is t i c  a n d  po l i t ica l  
au to n o m y .
T h e  primary goa ls  of t h e s e  m o v e m e n t s  a re  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
of ' legal,  e c o n o m i c  an d  political g u a r a n t e e s '  of t h e  p r o p o s e d  
re fo rm s  a n d  their  irreversibility. P e r e s t r o i k a  hit a  r e s p o n d e n t  
c h o rd  with th e  Baltic p e o p l e s .  D e ce n t ra l i z a t io n ,  a n  e n d  to 
b u r e a u c ra t i c  inertia,  cronyism, c a r e e r i s m  a n d  a b u s e s  of p o w e r  
a r e  highly re g a rd e d  in the  Balt ics.  T h e  m o v e m e n t s  p r o p o s e  a  
s e p a r a t i o n  of p ow er  b e t w e e n  legis la tive,  e x e c u t iv e  a n d  judicial  
a r e n a s  an d  in tha t  vein the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of const i tu tional cou r ts
20 S W B . SU 285, October 18, 1988, B/3.
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to e n s u r e  laws a re  followed.
Vaino Valjas,  First S e c re ta r y  of the  C o m m u n is t  Par ty  of the  
E s to n ia n  C en t r a l  C o m m i t t e e ,  b r o u g h t  g r e e t i n g s  from Mikhail 
G o r b a c h e v  to the  Es ton ian  Cons t i tuen t  C o n g r e s s  of t h e  P e o p le ' s  
Front .  This  sh o w  of s u p p o r t  from the  Sov ie t  l e a d e r s h ip  w a s  
im por tant to the  c a u s e  but w a s  not unequivocal.  Valjas  a s s e r t e d  
th a t  "The Estonian  P e o p le ' s  Front  shou ld  not try to t a k e  up a  
posit ion parallel  to the  C o m m u n is t  Party,  a n d  th e  ag g rav a t in g  of 
n a t io n a l i t i e s  i s s u e s  m u s t  no t  t a k e  t h e  g r o u n d  a w a y  from 
e c o n o m i c  r e f o r m s  a n d  o t h e r  r e fo rm  p r o j e c t s 2 1 ." T h e s e  
p a r a m e t e r s  a r e  very  s ignif icant in t e rm s  of w h a t  t h e  P o p u la r  
Front may and  may not do; it s e e m s  that  so  long a s  their  primary 
goal is suppor t  of G o rb a ch e v ’s  reforms an d  they do  not a t t em p t  to 
b e c o m e  an  opposi t ion party,  they may con t inue  to function.  The 
19th All-Union Party  C o n fe re n c e  s t a t e d  tha t  th e  party  favored  all 
p e o p le ' s  m o v e m e n ts  a s  a  posit ive socie ta l  force  a s  long a s  they 
help the  renewal and  reform p rocess .
T h e  m o v e m e n t s  a r e  exac t ly  w h a t  G o r b a c h e v  h a d  h o p e d  to 
sp a w n .  Many of his s p e e c h e s  h a v e  cri ticized th e  R u ss ia n  an d  
Sov ie t  tradit ion of ' revolution from above ' .  The  P e o p le ' s  Fronts  
r e p r e s e n t  t ru e  public init iat ives,  g r a s s - r o o t s  pa r t ic ipa t ion .  And 
b e t te r  yet, for G orbachev ,  their  ou tsp o k en  d e m a n d s  in suppor t  of 
his p r o g r a m s  help him in his fight with t h o s e  w ho  o p p o s e  his 
p ro g r am s  within the  Party  s tructure .  Such  a  cons t i tu en cy  for his 
r e f o r m s  is a  n e c e s s a r y  p r e c u r s o r  to t h e i r  s u c c e s s  a n d
21 SW B . SU 274 pp. cit. B/2.
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i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y .
T h e  limits to g l a s n o s t '  a r e  e v id e n t  in t h e  in to le ran ce  of 
S o v ie t  off ic ia ldom to s e v e r a l  o th e r  ' m o v e m e n t s '  which  h a v e  
e m e r g e d .  T h e  L e a g u e  of L i th u an ia ' s  Liber ty  a t t e m p t e d  an  
u n s a n c t io n e d  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  in Vilnius on  S e p t e m b e r  30,  1988. 
Ci t izens  be longing  to this an t i -Sovie t  g ro u p  took  to the  s t r e e t s  
a d v o c a t i n g  L i t h u a n i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  a  n o n - s o c i a l i s t  
g o v e r n m e n t .  In te rnal a f fa i rs  off icers  (KGB) m a d e  r e p e a t e d  
d e m a n d s  for the  g roup  to d i s b u r s e  18 mili t iamen w e re  injured in 
the  m e le e  and  over  25 p e r s o n s  w e re  d e t a i n e d 22 . T h e  Lithuanian 
g o v e r n m e n t  later i s s u e d  a  s t a t e m e n t  th a t  "ac t ions  con trad ic tory  
to the  in te re s t s  of th e  socia li s t  s t a t e  a n d  soc ie ty  a n d  impairing 
the  usual p a ce  of life a re  not going to b e  to le ra ted 23." However,  
the  next day  the  Lithuanian M ovem ent  in S u p p o r t  of P e re s t ro ik a  
( S a j u d i s ) he ld  an  u n a u t h o r i z e d  a n d  s p o n t a n e o u s  rally to 
d e n o u n c e  th e  c rue l ty  of t h e  mili t ia's t a c t i c s  in hand l ing  th e  
p rev ious  d a y s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  a n d  to d e n o u n c e  th e  i r responsib le  
ac t ions  of the  Liberty League ;  the  rally w a s  not d i s tu rbed  by the  
m i l i t i a 2 4 .
22 ibid. B/5.
23 Ibid.
2 4 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion: Limits to Openness?
The recently established Popular Fronts in the Baltic 
Republics have consciously allied themselves with support for 
the reforms and have been a useful way in which to advance 
previously unacceptable demands, for example, autonomy and 
nationalism. These movements address national, environmental 
and other issues of importance. Many of the movements have 
demanded the right to run candidates for local soviets. This idea 
is not as unusual as one first may think because the "collective 
power of ' ob shes t vennos t '  the concept of the public acting for 
itself outside the framework of the state, (is) a power 
traditionally honored in the breach1." Additionally, many of 
the new social movement groups will run candidates for the new 
Congress of People's Deputies, which will choose the next Central 
Committee, possibly a huge step toward some form of 
meaningful participation of the masses.
1 Remington, Thomas F. "A Socialist Pluralism of Opinions: Glasnost' and Policy 
-Making Under Gorbachev." (unpublished paper presented at the Southern 
Political Science Association Conference, November 1988) pg. 28.
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Gorbachev's  recognition of his need for a support 
constituency for his reform program has led him to allow a wide 
variety of behaviors that were previously unthinkable. He 
seems to be gradually moving toward what he terms 
" de mo kr a t i z c i t s i i a "  or democratization; a more multi-tiered 
system of represen ta t ion  which would  allow popu lar  
organizations to elect representatives to lower level policy 
making bodies within the context of Party supremacy. Ideology, 
defense, foreign and development strategies would remain 
under the firm control of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU).
Although the Party, in Gorbachev's view, will remain in 
control of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev has stated that the Party 
no longer has a monopoly on the truth; this is important for the 
new social and political climate. A multiplicity of opinions and 
possibly of parties is now conceivable. Allowing secret ballot 
voting, up to and including the position of regional first 
secretary, is designed to increase accountability and allow truth 
to emerge from the clash of a 'socialist pluralism of opinions'; 
grass roots democracy under the umbrel la  of democrat ic  
centralism. Despite appearances, there is pluralism in the 
Soviet Union. The republics play a role in policy making. 
Republic elites can have a large impact on policies as can the 
mere existence of a possibility of a loss of control in non-Russian 
areas. The ethnic question is never far from the minds of the
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policy makers, "the political, economic and cultural resources 
now possessed by the republics translate into increasing
influence and weight in the Soviet system and its policy
p r o c e s s 2 ." The proliferation of mass movements greatly 
increases the quantity and quality of pluralism that exists in the 
Soviet Union and enables the process to become more 
democratic, more rapidly.
Pluralism, though limited in the past, has been most
noticeable when the leadership has occasionally tolerated 
nationalist beliefs. However, historically, nationalistic behavior 
has not been tolerated; it has always been suppressed quickly,
brutally and effectively. This is true even under glasnost ' .  For 
example, all twelve members of the Karabakh Committee, the 
Armenian group advocating the annexation of the disputed 
region of Nagorno-Karabakh, were arrested and martial law was 
imposed in both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a result of the 
ethnic unrest there. The unrest was neither supportive of 
reform nor of Gorbachev and therefore was suppressed. 
Similarly, the recent disturbances in the Ukraine, Moldavia and 
Georgia, which have been decidedly anti-Soviet, have also been 
put d^wn.
In short, Gorbachev's priority is domestic economic reform. 
If ethnic unrest aids him in attaining his reform goals, then the 
unrest is treated differently from unrest that hinders the 
reforms, as emphasized by Alexander Motyl:
2 Motyl, Alexander J. o p . cit. pa. 152.
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"Economic modernization is Gorbachev's 
highest priority. But Gorbachev has come to 
understand that modernization is contingent 
upon a renewal of the political system. 
A dm in is t ra t ive  e f fec t iv en ess  must be 
enhanced and political opposition quelled for 
the radical economic measures he envisions 
to take effect and to work. In turn, political 
restructuring means mobilizing the support 
of various elite and popular constituencies 
through greater publicity and g l as n o s t ’ and 
i n c r e a s e d  p o p u l a r  i n i t i a t i v e  and  
participation (democratization). All of these
are laudable goals, but even laudable goals
can have u n in te n d e d  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  
Unfortunately for Gorbachev, measures to 
cope with these consequences may be fatal 
to perestroika^
Regardless of the intent of glasnost ' ,  openness will have the 
unintended consequence of encouraging ethnic unrest of all 
varieties. The combination of polit ical decentra lizat ion 
(g l a sn o s t ' and democratization) and economic decentralization 
(p e r e s t r o i k a ) could be the combination that could lead to the 
disintegration of the Soviet system.
The evolution of new quasi-political structures such as the 
People's Fronts may be the beginning of such a disintegration.
More likely, they are a manifestation of systemic change within
the Soviet Union or a 'steam release' for venting frustration with 
the system designed merely to allow a temporary diffusion of
3 Motyl, Alexander J. o p . cit. pg. 161.
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tensions. Additionally, the new mass movements can serve as a 
focal point for the ire of Gorbachev's conservative critics thus 
diffusing their opposition. According to Nikolay Mitkin, the 
Second Secretary of the Communist Party of the Lithuanian 
Central Committee has said:
"If some people from the Lithuanian 
Movement for P e r es t r o yk a  air their view 
and opinions in a non-standard way, 
resor ting to firm and even impudent 
devices, there is no need to push the panic 
button. We must learn to hear the views 
of people whose opinion seems to be 
different from ours and especially when 
they have true facts to back their views...1 
have been asked on many occasions 
whether the movement is an opposition 
party: no, it isn't. I see it as a democratic 
m ovem ent ,  e x p re s s in g  the peop le 's  
constitutional rights to take part in the 
governing of the state4."
The Latvian First Secretary Vagris also asserts that the Latvian 
People's Front in Support of Per es t ro i ka  is "neither a political 
nor an opposition organization but a broad movement in 
support of restructuring and glasnos t '  advocating strengthening 
the power of local soviets, developing culture and protecting the 
e n v i r o n m e n t 5 ." There are, of course, radical members of the 
People's Fronts who see these movements as opposition parties 
or as revolutionary forces for change. However, the majority of
4 S W B . SU 247, September 3, 1988, B/6.
5 S W B . SU 278, October 10, 1988, i.
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the movements' members are more pragmatic and desire to gain 
autonomy within the Soviet system rather than assert  
independence and risk a more brutal, and more visible, Soviet 
presence.
The key question remains: how far will the Baltic unrest be 
allowed to go? The unrest has only been tolerated thus far due 
to the pressing domestic imperative of economic reform, 
peres t roika.  The Estonians and the Lithuanians both anticipate 
a crackdown in the near future. This fear is based on the 
creation of a new Politburo commission on the Baltic Republics 
chaired by Vadim Medvedev, a noted hard-liner on national self 
assertion. S a j u d i s ,  the Lithuanian movement, has become 
progressively more radical in recent months and relations 
between the Lithuanian Party and S a j u d i s  have becom e  
strained. The Estonian People's Front has also become more 
radical. The Estonians have called for autonomy and have 
attempted to give the republic veto power over Soviet laws. 
These actions have been poorly received, but allowed*’. How 
far and how fast the movements can safely progress is unknown. 
Economic autonomy may be acceptable, secession is not.
A crackdown, however, would not be in the best interest of 
the Soviet state unless secession was imminent. Gorbachev has 
been working long and hard to polish the international image of
6 Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Lithuania, Baltic Rumblings: Activists Warn of a 
Crackdown." Christian Science Monitor (February 28, 1989) pgs. 1,2 and 
"Loosening the Ties that Bind: Estonians on a Collision Course with Moscow." 
Christian Science Monitor (February 16, 1989) pgs. 1,2.
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the Soviet Union through arms control initiatives, payment of 
United Nations debts, repayment of the tsarist debt to Britain 
and overtures to Japan and the People's Republic of China, to 
name but a few. He has greatly enhanced the international 
legitimacy of his regime. This image will help him to achieve 
and maintain the calming of tensions that is necessary for him to 
justify the reduction of military spending. Such reductions 
would free up capital, technology and skilled labor badly needed 
for the success of the domestic reforms. Such an international 
environment will also be conducive to trade, technology 
transfers and the massive lending of capital from the West to the 
Soviet Union, which many scholars feel is very important to the 
success of peres t ro i ka .  Cracking down on the Baltic republics 
would surely cause an erosion of that good will and therefore is 
unlikely.
In addition, a crackdown on ethnic unrest in the Baltic 
republics would also harm the credibility of the reforms on the 
domestic front. Many Soviet citizens are already wary and 
distrustful of g l a s n o s t '  and perestroika' ,  they have seen 
reforms come and go before, always leaving in their wake people 
who were punished when the reform failed or were revoked. 
The Soviets remain cynical and skeptical of the current wave of 
reform, crushing unrest in the Baltic would symbolize the 
whimsy of yet another wave of reforms. Since the Baltic 
republics represent the qualities that the reforms are meant to
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cultivate, the effect of a crackdown would be magnified. This 
would also be true because the Baltic republics have been held 
up as the models for economic and political change. The Baltic 
republics are also important as allies of, and constituents for, the 
reforms. Above all, Gorbachev needs allies and supporters of the 
reforms in order to win his battles with his conservative 
opposition. Regardless, the Baltic movements constitute a 
challenge to the Communist Party. How will the Party respond 
to the challenge? Will the Party compete with the movements, 
thus widening the political base of the Party? Will the Party 
allow the existence of such pluralism? Or will the Party choose 
to crush the movements and thus the challenge? Given the 
domestic imperative of reform, the Party should choose to 
broaden its political base and accept the challenge of the Baltic 
movements while allowing them to continue to exist. By 
adopting at least some of the movements'  platforms and 
allowing the movements to continue to function, the leadership 
can diffuse dissent and increase Party legitimacy in the Baltic 
region and possibly in other republics as well. The competition, 
even if regulated, which the movements would provide for the 
Party should serve to reinvigorate the Party which has long been 
one of Gorbachev's goals. Gorbachev could also use the continued 
existence of these movements to draw the fire of his opponents, 
thus diffusing their criticisms of his policies. International 
legitimacy would also be enhanced due to the high visibility of 
the movements' pluralistic actions.
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The limits to openness are, as yet, undefined. However, the 
limits can be estimated. Gorbachev's overriding priority is 
domestic economic reform and therefore he must do whatever 
is necessary to ensure the success of that reform. Since the 
Baltic republics are integrally important to perestroika  a n d  
since a crackdown on the ethnic unrest there could have 
damaging domestic and international ramifications, it is highly 
likely that the Baltic republics will be allowed to continue to test 
the limits of Gorbachev's policies. The limit to openness would 
seem to be just short of secession.
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